From 160267417e310c6f181c80faac6173eb515cabe2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: nopoz <bill.lowney@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2026 15:50:15 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] fix(personal): scope RAG file delete to the caller's own
 upload dir (#4602)

The DELETE /api/personal/file disk-delete containment check used the
shared PERSONAL_UPLOADS_DIR root, so one admin could delete another
user's personal upload by passing its path (uploads are partitioned per
owner under <root>/<owner>/). Confine the check to the caller's own
per-owner subdir via _personal_upload_dir_for_owner(owner). RAG removal
and listing exclusion are unchanged (they still serve non-upload indexed
sources). Adds a regression test for the cross-owner case.
---
 routes/personal_routes.py                     |  6 ++++--
 .../test_personal_delete_file_confinement.py  | 21 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/routes/personal_routes.py b/routes/personal_routes.py
index e6906223e..a42615be7 100644
--- a/routes/personal_routes.py
+++ b/routes/personal_routes.py
@@ -358,11 +358,13 @@ def setup_personal_routes(personal_docs_manager, rag_manager, rag_available):
                 except Exception as e:
                     logger.warning(f"RAG removal failed for {filepath}: {e}")
 
-            # Delete file from disk if it's in uploads dir
+            # Delete file from disk if it's in the caller's own uploads dir.
+            # Scope to the per-owner subdir, not the shared uploads root, so one
+            # admin can't delete another user's personal files by path.
             deleted_from_disk = False
             try:
                 abs_target = os.path.realpath(filepath)
-                base_abs = os.path.realpath(UPLOADS_DIR)
+                base_abs = os.path.realpath(_personal_upload_dir_for_owner(owner, create=False))
                 in_uploads = (
                     abs_target == base_abs
                     or os.path.commonpath([abs_target, base_abs]) == base_abs
diff --git a/tests/test_personal_delete_file_confinement.py b/tests/test_personal_delete_file_confinement.py
index 346a15028..03bc40db0 100644
--- a/tests/test_personal_delete_file_confinement.py
+++ b/tests/test_personal_delete_file_confinement.py
@@ -72,3 +72,24 @@ def test_delete_file_removes_regular_file_inside_upload_root(tmp_path, monkeypat
     assert not uploaded_file.exists()
     assert docs.excluded == [filepath]
     assert rag.deleted_sources == [filepath]
+
+
+def test_delete_file_refuses_other_owners_upload(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    # alice must not be able to delete a file living under bob's per-owner
+    # upload subdir, even though it sits inside the shared uploads root.
+    uploads = tmp_path / "uploads"
+    uploads.mkdir()
+    victim = uploads / "bob" / "secret.txt"
+    victim.parent.mkdir()
+    victim.write_text("keep me", encoding="utf-8")
+
+    docs = _FakePersonalDocs()
+    rag = _FakeRAG()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(personal_routes, "UPLOADS_DIR", str(uploads))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(personal_routes, "get_rag_manager", lambda: rag)
+
+    filepath = str(victim)
+    result = asyncio.run(_delete_endpoint(docs)(filepath=filepath, owner="alice", _admin=None))
+
+    assert result["deleted_from_disk"] is False
+    assert victim.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "keep me"