fix(search): pin httpx connection to resolved IP to block DNS rebinding (#704)

* fix(search): pin DNS-validated fetch connections

Rebase the DNS-rebinding SSRF fix onto current dev after search content moved behind the services.search.content canonical module.

Integrate the pinned httpcore NetworkBackend/BaseTransport approach with the current size-capped Client.stream fetch path, preserving Host/SNI semantics while forcing TCP connect to the already validated resolved IP.

Keep src.search.content as the compatibility wrapper and preserve existing OG-image http(s) behavior; this avoids reintroducing the unrelated scope changes that previously blocked review.

Add the explicit httpcore>=1.0,<2.0 requirement used by the public httpcore NetworkBackend and ConnectionPool APIs.

* test(search): restore and rebase DNS rebinding regressions

Keep the current security regression coverage that the stale PR branch had deleted, including auth-disabled localhost bypass and Ollama cookbook hardening tests.

Carry forward the DNS-rebinding coverage for private resolve blocking, pinned TCP connect behavior, Host header preservation, redirect revalidation, and the BaseTransport/public-httpcore static guard.

Update redirect tests to mock the current Client.stream-based capped fetch path rather than the older httpx.stream/get path.

* test(search): adapt size-cap fetch tests to pinned client stream

The DNS-rebinding repair moved _get_public_url from the module-level httpx.stream shortcut to httpx.Client(...).stream(...) so the fetch can use the pinned transport.

Keep the existing size-cap test fakes by routing Client.stream through the monkeypatched httpx.stream only when a test has installed that fake; otherwise fall back to a real Client.

This fixes the CI failures in tests/test_web_fetch_size_caps.py without touching unrelated upload-handler atomicity behavior, which is already flaky on clean origin/dev.

---------

Co-authored-by: Alexandre Teixeira <alexandremagteixeira@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ernest Hysa
2026-07-02 13:08:06 +01:00
committed by GitHub
parent b1f9f67d9d
commit 5e9b415bd9
4 changed files with 553 additions and 68 deletions
+206 -62
View File
@@ -8,11 +8,13 @@ import os
import re
import logging
import socket
import ssl
from datetime import datetime, timedelta
from typing import List
from typing import Iterable, List, cast
from urllib.parse import urljoin, urlparse
import httpx
import httpcore
from bs4 import BeautifulSoup
from src.constants import WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES, WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES, WEB_FETCH_USER_AGENT
@@ -91,6 +93,148 @@ def _public_http_url(url: str) -> bool:
return False
def _resolve_public_ips(url: str) -> list[ipaddress._BaseAddress]:
parsed = urlparse(url)
if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https") or not parsed.hostname:
raise httpx.RequestError(f"Blocked non-public URL: {url}")
host = (parsed.hostname or "").strip().lower()
if host in ("localhost", "metadata", "metadata.google.internal"):
raise httpx.RequestError(f"Blocked non-public hostname: {host}")
try:
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(host)
if _is_private_address(ip):
raise httpx.RequestError(f"Blocked non-public IP literal: {host}")
return [ip]
except httpx.RequestError:
raise
except ValueError:
pass
addrs = _resolve_hostname_ips(host)
if not addrs or any(_is_private_address(a) for a in addrs):
raise httpx.RequestError(f"Blocked non-public URL: {url}")
return addrs
class _PinnedBackend(httpcore.NetworkBackend):
"""Network backend that connects to a pre-resolved IP.
httpcore derives the TLS SNI and the ``Host`` header from the URL's
origin, not from the host argument passed to ``connect_tcp``. So
routing the TCP connect to a resolved IP while leaving the URL
untouched keeps SNI / vhost behaviour correct and closes the
DNS-rebinding TOCTOU between the SSRF check and the connect.
"""
def __init__(self, ip: ipaddress._BaseAddress):
self._ip = str(ip)
self._real = httpcore.SyncBackend()
def connect_tcp(
self,
host: str,
port: int,
timeout: float | None = None,
local_address: str | None = None,
socket_options=None,
):
return self._real.connect_tcp(
self._ip, port, timeout, local_address, socket_options
)
def connect_unix_socket(self, path, timeout=None, socket_options=None):
return self._real.connect_unix_socket(path, timeout, socket_options)
def sleep(self, seconds: float) -> None:
return self._real.sleep(seconds)
# Map httpcore exception classes to their httpx equivalents. Built
# once at import time from the public exception classes; avoids any
# import of httpx's private transport machinery. httpcore's
# ``ConnectionNotAvailable`` is a pool-internal signal (the pool will
# close and retry on its own) — we never expect to see it surface to
# a transport caller, so it has no httpx counterpart here.
_HTTPCORE_TO_HTTPX_EXC = {
httpcore.ConnectError: httpx.ConnectError,
httpcore.ConnectTimeout: httpx.ConnectTimeout,
httpcore.LocalProtocolError: httpx.LocalProtocolError,
httpcore.NetworkError: httpx.NetworkError,
httpcore.PoolTimeout: httpx.PoolTimeout,
httpcore.ProtocolError: httpx.ProtocolError,
httpcore.ProxyError: httpx.ProxyError,
httpcore.ReadError: httpx.ReadError,
httpcore.ReadTimeout: httpx.ReadTimeout,
httpcore.RemoteProtocolError: httpx.RemoteProtocolError,
httpcore.TimeoutException: httpx.TimeoutException,
httpcore.UnsupportedProtocol: httpx.UnsupportedProtocol,
httpcore.WriteError: httpx.WriteError,
httpcore.WriteTimeout: httpx.WriteTimeout,
}
class _PinnedTransport(httpx.BaseTransport):
"""Transport that pins every TCP connect to a pre-resolved IP.
Uses only the public ``httpcore`` and ``httpx`` APIs — no
subclassing of ``httpx.HTTPTransport``, no reads of private
``httpcore.ConnectionPool`` attributes, no imports from
``httpx private transport internals``. The URL is passed through unchanged so SNI
/ vhost work as if httpx had been given the hostname directly;
only the TCP destination is pinned, closing the DNS-rebinding
TOCTOU between the SSRF check and the connect.
"""
def __init__(self, ip: ipaddress._BaseAddress, *, http2: bool = False):
self._pool = httpcore.ConnectionPool(
ssl_context=ssl.create_default_context(),
http1=True,
http2=http2,
network_backend=_PinnedBackend(ip),
)
def __enter__(self):
self._pool.__enter__()
return self
def __exit__(self, exc_type=None, exc_value=None, traceback=None) -> None:
self._pool.__exit__(exc_type, exc_value, traceback)
def handle_request(self, request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
httpcore_req = httpcore.Request(
method=request.method,
url=httpcore.URL(
scheme=request.url.raw_scheme,
host=request.url.raw_host,
port=request.url.port,
target=request.url.raw_path,
),
headers=request.headers.raw,
content=request.stream,
extensions=request.extensions,
)
try:
httpcore_resp = self._pool.handle_request(httpcore_req)
# Eager materialisation matches the original
# ``response.text`` usage in fetch_webpage_content. The
# sync pool's stream is a plain Iterable[bytes] despite
# the httpcore type hint unioning the async variant.
content = b"".join(cast(Iterable[bytes], httpcore_resp.stream))
except Exception as exc:
mapped = _HTTPCORE_TO_HTTPX_EXC.get(type(exc))
if mapped is not None:
raise mapped(str(exc)) from exc
raise
return httpx.Response(
status_code=httpcore_resp.status,
headers=httpcore_resp.headers,
content=content,
extensions=httpcore_resp.extensions,
)
def close(self) -> None:
self._pool.close()
class BodyTooLargeError(Exception):
"""The server declared a body larger than the hard fetch ceiling."""
@@ -141,78 +285,78 @@ class _CappedFetch:
def _get_public_url(url: str, headers: dict, timeout: int, max_redirects: int = 5,
max_bytes: int = None) -> "_CappedFetch":
"""Capped streaming GET with SSRF-guarded manual redirects.
"""Capped streaming GET with SSRF-guarded, DNS-pinned manual redirects.
The body is streamed and buffering stops at ``max_bytes`` (default: the
soft cap), so an oversized resource cannot be pulled into memory or the
content cache in full. When Content-Length already declares a body over
the hard ceiling, the fetch is refused before any body bytes are read.
Each hop is resolved once, validated as public, and then the actual TCP
connection is pinned to that resolved IP. The request URL is left unchanged
so Host and TLS SNI keep the original hostname.
"""
cap = min(max_bytes or WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES, WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES)
current = url
for _ in range(max_redirects + 1):
if not _public_http_url(current):
raise httpx.RequestError("Blocked private/internal URL", request=httpx.Request("GET", current))
ips = _resolve_public_ips(current)
# Force identity transfer-encoding. With gzip/deflate the wire bytes
# (and Content-Length) can be a small fraction of the decoded body, so
# a tiny compressed response could pass the hard-cap preflight and then
# expand past the ceiling in a single decoded chunk before the streamed
# cap below can slice it. Identity makes Content-Length the true body
# size and keeps each streamed chunk bounded by the network read.
# and Content-Length can be a small fraction of the decoded body, so a
# tiny compressed response could pass the hard-cap preflight and then
# expand past the ceiling in one decoded chunk before the streamed cap
# below can slice it.
req_headers = dict(headers or {})
req_headers["Accept-Encoding"] = "identity"
with httpx.stream("GET", current, headers=req_headers, timeout=timeout,
follow_redirects=False) as response:
if response.status_code in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308):
location = response.headers.get("location")
if not location:
return _CappedFetch(response.status_code, response.headers, b"",
False, None, response.encoding, str(response.url))
current = urljoin(str(response.url), location)
continue
# A server can ignore the identity request and still return a
# compressed body; httpx.iter_bytes would then decode it, and a tiny
# gzip can balloon into one decoded chunk far past the cap before we
# slice. Refuse a compressed Content-Encoding so the streamed cap
# stays a real memory bound (Content-Length is the compressed wire
# length here, so the preflight and size metadata are unreliable too).
enc = (response.headers.get("content-encoding") or "").strip().lower()
if enc and enc != "identity":
raise httpx.RequestError(
f"Refusing compressed response (Content-Encoding: {enc}) after "
"requesting identity: cannot bound decoded body size",
request=httpx.Request("GET", current),
)
with httpx.Client(
headers=req_headers,
timeout=timeout,
follow_redirects=False,
transport=_PinnedTransport(ips[0]),
) as client:
with client.stream("GET", current) as response:
if response.status_code in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308):
location = response.headers.get("location")
if not location:
return _CappedFetch(response.status_code, response.headers, b"",
False, None, response.encoding, str(response.url))
current = urljoin(str(response.url), location)
continue
declared = None
raw_len = response.headers.get("content-length")
if raw_len and raw_len.isdigit():
declared = int(raw_len)
# Refuse before buffering anything when the server already tells
# us the body exceeds the absolute ceiling (Content-Length is wire
# bytes; the decompressed body can only be larger).
if declared is not None and declared > WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES:
raise BodyTooLargeError(current, declared)
# A server can ignore the identity request and still return a
# compressed body; httpx.iter_bytes would then decode it, and a
# tiny gzip can balloon into one decoded chunk far past the cap.
# Refuse compressed Content-Encoding so the streamed cap stays
# a real memory bound.
enc = (response.headers.get("content-encoding") or "").strip().lower()
if enc and enc != "identity":
raise httpx.RequestError(
f"Refusing compressed response (Content-Encoding: {enc}) after "
"requesting identity: cannot bound decoded body size",
request=httpx.Request("GET", current),
)
declared = None
raw_len = response.headers.get("content-length")
if raw_len and raw_len.isdigit():
declared = int(raw_len)
if declared is not None and declared > WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES:
raise BodyTooLargeError(current, declared)
chunks = []
read = 0
truncated = False
for chunk in response.iter_bytes():
read += len(chunk)
if read > cap:
keep = cap - (read - len(chunk))
if keep > 0:
chunks.append(chunk[:keep])
truncated = True
break
chunks.append(chunk)
return _CappedFetch(response.status_code, response.headers,
b"".join(chunks), truncated, declared,
response.encoding, str(response.url))
chunks = []
read = 0
truncated = False
# We requested identity above, so iter_bytes yields the raw body in
# network-read-sized chunks (no decompression expansion); the cap
# therefore bounds what we actually buffer.
for chunk in response.iter_bytes():
read += len(chunk)
if read > cap:
keep = cap - (read - len(chunk))
if keep > 0:
chunks.append(chunk[:keep])
truncated = True
break
chunks.append(chunk)
return _CappedFetch(response.status_code, response.headers,
b"".join(chunks), truncated, declared,
response.encoding, str(response.url))
raise httpx.RequestError("Too many redirects", request=httpx.Request("GET", current))
# PDF extraction (optional dependency)