Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/dev'

# Conflicts:
#	routes/contacts_routes.py

src/agent_loop.py

@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ Bulk delete/archive/mark emails. Use this for "delete all those" after listing e
 {"action": "create_event", "summary": "<event title>", "dtstart": "<natural language or ISO datetime>"}
 ```
 Calendar event management (CalDAV). Actions: `list_events`, `create_event`, `update_event`, `delete_event`, `list_calendars`. \
-For `list_events`: {start?, end?, calendar?}; prefer `start`/`end` for the range, though start_date/end_date and from/to aliases are accepted. \
+For `list_events`: {action: "list_events", start: "YYYY-MM-DDT00:00:00", end: "YYYY-MM-DDT00:00:00", calendar?}; resolve month/week phrases yourself from the Current date and time context and do not pass a loose `query` field. Prefer `start`/`end`; start_time/end_time, start_date/end_date, and from/to aliases are accepted. \
 For `create_event`: {summary, dtstart, dtend?, duration?, calendar?, location?, description?, reminder_minutes?, rrule?}. \
 For `update_event`: {uid, summary?, dtstart?, dtend?, all_day?, location?, description?, event_type?, importance?, rrule?}. Pass `rrule: ""` to remove recurrence and make a repeating event a single event. \
 `dtstart` accepts natural language ("tomorrow at 1pm", "in 2 hours", "next monday 9am") or ISO ("2026-05-12T13:00:00"). \
@@ -2845,11 +2845,17 @@ async def stream_agent_loop(
                         )
                         logger.info(f"[tool-rag] Retrieved tools for query: {sorted(_relevant_tools - ALWAYS_AVAILABLE)}")
                     except asyncio.TimeoutError:
+                        # Leave _relevant_tools unset so the keyword fallback
+                        # below still runs. Hard-coding ALWAYS_AVAILABLE here
+                        # skipped the deterministic keyword hints whenever the
+                        # embedding backend was slow (e.g. a remote endpoint
+                        # cold-loading its model), silently stripping email/
+                        # calendar tools from queries that named them outright.
                         logger.warning(
-                            "[tool-rag] Retrieval exceeded %.1fs; falling back to always-available tools",
+                            "[tool-rag] Retrieval exceeded %.1fs; falling back to keyword tool selection",
                             _TOOL_SELECTION_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
                         )
-                        _relevant_tools = set(ALWAYS_AVAILABLE)
+                        _relevant_tools = None
         except Exception as e:
             logger.warning(f"[tool-rag] Retrieval failed, using keyword fallback: {e}")
             _relevant_tools = None

src/agent_tools/filesystem_tools.py

@@ -281,7 +281,13 @@ class LsTool:
 
 class GlobTool:
     async def execute(self, content: str, ctx: dict) -> dict:
-        from src.tool_execution import _resolve_tool_path, _resolve_search_root, _truncate
+        from src.tool_execution import (
+            _SENSITIVE_BASENAMES,
+            _is_sensitive_path,
+            _resolve_tool_path,
+            _resolve_search_root,
+            _truncate,
+        )
         args = {}
         _s = (content or "").strip()
         if _s.startswith("{"):
@@ -322,7 +328,11 @@ class GlobTool:
                     ) == nbase
                 except ValueError:
                     inside = False
-                if inside and os.path.exists(cand):
+                # A literal that names a deny-listed sensitive file (.env,
+                # .ssh/id_rsa, …) falls through to the walk, which skips it —
+                # otherwise glob would surface secret paths that read_file /
+                # grep already refuse to touch.
+                if inside and os.path.exists(cand) and not _is_sensitive_path(cand):
                     return [cand], None
                 # Literal not at exact path — fall through to walk so
                 # e.g. "foo.py" still matches at any depth (like rglob).
@@ -334,11 +344,20 @@ class GlobTool:
                 for dp, dns, fns in os.walk(base):
                     # Prune skipped dirs before descending (unlike rglob which
                     # descends first then filters — fatal on large node_modules).
-                    dns[:] = [d for d in dns if d not in _CODENAV_SKIP_DIRS]
+                    # Sensitive dirs (.ssh, .gnupg, …) are pruned too so glob
+                    # never enumerates the keys/tokens inside them.
+                    dns[:] = [
+                        d for d in dns
+                        if d not in _CODENAV_SKIP_DIRS and d not in _SENSITIVE_BASENAMES
+                    ]
                     for name in fns + dns:
                         full = os.path.join(dp, name)
                         rel = os.path.relpath(full, base).replace(os.sep, "/")
                         if regex.fullmatch(rel) or regex.fullmatch(name):
+                            # Skip deny-listed sensitive files (.env, id_rsa,
+                            # known_hosts, …) the same way grep does.
+                            if _is_sensitive_path(os.path.realpath(full)):
+                                continue
                             try:
                                 mtime = os.stat(full).st_mtime
                             except OSError:
@@ -405,8 +424,12 @@ class GrepTool:
                     cmd.append("--ignore-case")
                 if glob_pat:
                     cmd += ["--glob", glob_pat]
+                # --iglob (not --glob) so the exclusion is case-insensitive:
+                # on a case-insensitive filesystem "ID_RSA"/"Known_Hosts"
+                # resolve to the same secret as their lowercase forms, and the
+                # Python fallback below already folds case via _is_sensitive_path.
                 for _pat in _SENSITIVE_FILE_PATTERNS:
-                    cmd += ["--glob", f"!*{_pat}*"]
+                    cmd += ["--iglob", f"!*{_pat}*"]
                 for _d in _CODENAV_SKIP_DIRS:
                     cmd += ["--glob", f"!**/{_d}/**"]
                 cmd += ["--regexp", pattern, root]

src/agent_tools/session_tools.py

@@ -184,8 +184,12 @@ async def send_to_session(content: str, session_id: Optional[str] = None, owner:
     if not sess:
         return {"error": f"Session '{target_sid}' not found"}
 
-    # Owner-scope: reject access to another user's session
-    if owner and getattr(sess, "owner", None) and sess.owner != owner:
+    # Owner-scope: reject access to another user's session. When the caller is
+    # authenticated, a null-owner (legacy / auth-was-off) session is not theirs
+    # either — list_sessions (get_sessions_for_user) and manage_session already
+    # exclude those, so treating it as reachable here let an authenticated agent
+    # read/write a session the other tools hide. Require an exact owner match.
+    if owner and getattr(sess, "owner", None) != owner:
         return {"error": f"Session '{target_sid}' not found"}
 
     if not message:

src/integrations.py

@@ -216,7 +216,14 @@ def _normalize_integration_base_url(base_url: Any) -> str:
 
 
 def _join_integration_url(base_url: str, path: str) -> str:
-    return urljoin(base_url.rstrip("/") + "/", path.lstrip("/"))
+    base = base_url.rstrip("/")
+    rel = path.lstrip("/")
+    if not rel:
+        # A bare "/" must resolve to the base URL itself, not base + "/".
+        # POST-to-base integrations (e.g. Discord webhooks) 404 on the
+        # trailing-slash variant of their URL.
+        return base
+    return urljoin(base + "/", rel)
 
 
 def load_integrations() -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
@@ -394,6 +401,22 @@ async def execute_api_call(
         return {"error": "Path must not contain a fragment", "exit_code": 1}
 
     url = _join_integration_url(base_url, path)
+
+    # SSRF guard — same check used by the gallery endpoint, embeddings,
+    # CardDAV, and the reminder webhook sender. Link-local / metadata
+    # addresses (169.254.x.x — the cloud credential-exfil vector) are always
+    # rejected; INTEGRATION_API_BLOCK_PRIVATE_IPS=true also blocks RFC-1918 /
+    # loopback for locked-down deployments. Private stays allowed by default
+    # because LAN integrations (Home Assistant, Miniflux, ntfy) are the
+    # primary use case.
+    from src.url_safety import check_outbound_url
+    block_private = os.getenv(
+        "INTEGRATION_API_BLOCK_PRIVATE_IPS", "false"
+    ).lower() == "true"
+    ok, reason = check_outbound_url(url, block_private=block_private)
+    if not ok:
+        return {"error": f"URL rejected: {reason}", "exit_code": 1}
+
     method = method.upper()
 
     # Build headers

src/rag_manager.py

@@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ class RAGManager:
         logger.info("RAGManager initialized as wrapper for VectorRAG")
     
     # Delegate all methods to VectorRAG
-    def search(self, query: str, k: int = 5) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
+    def search(self, query: str, k: int = 5, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
         """Search for documents - delegates to VectorRAG."""
-        return self.vector_rag.search(query, k)
+        return self.vector_rag.search(query, k, owner=owner)
     
     def index_personal_documents(
         self,

src/task_action_policy.py

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+"""Shared privilege policy for scheduled task actions."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+ADMIN_ONLY_TASK_ACTIONS = frozenset({
+    "run_local",
+    "run_script",
+    "ssh_command",
+    "cookbook_serve",
+})
+
+
+def is_admin_only_task_action(task_type: str | None, action: str | None) -> bool:
+    return (task_type or "llm") == "action" and (action or "") in ADMIN_ONLY_TASK_ACTIONS
+
+
+def owner_has_admin_task_privileges(owner: str | None) -> bool:
+    try:
+        from src.auth_helpers import _auth_disabled
+        if _auth_disabled():
+            return True
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+
+    if owner:
+        try:
+            from core.middleware import INTERNAL_TOOL_USER
+            if owner == INTERNAL_TOOL_USER:
+                return True
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+
+    try:
+        from core.auth import AuthManager
+        auth = AuthManager()
+        if not auth.is_configured:
+            return True
+        if not owner:
+            return False
+        return bool(auth.is_admin(owner))
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+
+    if not owner:
+        return False
+
+    return False

src/task_scheduler.py

@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
 from typing import Any, Awaitable, Callable, Dict, Tuple
 
 from core.auth import RESERVED_USERNAMES
+from src.task_action_policy import (
+    is_admin_only_task_action,
+    owner_has_admin_task_privileges,
+)
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -821,6 +825,28 @@ class TaskScheduler:
                     db.commit()
                 return
 
+            if (
+                is_admin_only_task_action(task.task_type, task.action)
+                and not owner_has_admin_task_privileges(task.owner)
+            ):
+                msg = f"Action '{task.action}' requires admin privileges"
+                blocked = db.query(TaskRun).filter(TaskRun.id == run_id).first()
+                if blocked:
+                    blocked.status = "error"
+                    blocked.result = msg
+                    blocked.error = msg
+                    blocked.finished_at = _utcnow()
+                task.status = "paused"
+                task.next_run = None
+                task.last_run = _utcnow()
+                logger.warning(
+                    "Paused admin-only task %s for non-admin owner %r",
+                    task_id,
+                    task.owner,
+                )
+                db.commit()
+                return
+
             if gate_foreground:
                 waiting = db.query(TaskRun).filter(TaskRun.id == run_id).first()
                 if waiting and waiting.status == "queued":

src/tool_execution.py

@@ -71,25 +71,35 @@ _SENSITIVE_FILE_PATTERNS: tuple[str, ...] = (
     "known_hosts",
 )
 
+# Case-folded views used for matching. On a case-insensitive filesystem
+# (Windows, default macOS) ".SSH/AUTHORIZED_KEYS" and ".env" resolve to the
+# same protected files as their lowercase forms, so the deny-list has to fold
+# case before comparing — the sibling resolver already normcases paths for the
+# same reason. casefold (not os.path.normcase) because normcase is a no-op on
+# POSIX, which is exactly where the macOS read-exfil path lives.
+_SENSITIVE_BASENAMES_CF: frozenset[str] = frozenset(b.casefold() for b in _SENSITIVE_BASENAMES)
+_SENSITIVE_FILE_PATTERNS_CF: frozenset[str] = frozenset(p.casefold() for p in _SENSITIVE_FILE_PATTERNS)
+
 
 def _is_sensitive_path(resolved: str) -> bool:
     """Return True if *resolved* falls under a sensitive directory or
     matches a sensitive filename — regardless of what root it sits under.
+
+    Matching is case-insensitive: on Windows / default macOS a case-variant
+    name (``.SSH``, ``AUTHORIZED_KEYS``, ``Id_Rsa``) points at the same file as
+    the lowercase form, so a case-sensitive check would let it slip past the
+    deny-list in every file tool that relies on it.
     """
-    parts = resolved.split(os.sep)
-    filenames: set[str] = {parts[-1]} if parts else set()
+    parts = [p.casefold() for p in resolved.split(os.sep)]
+    filename = parts[-1] if parts else ""
 
     # Check if any path component is a sensitive directory.
     for part in parts:
-        if part in _SENSITIVE_BASENAMES:
+        if part in _SENSITIVE_BASENAMES_CF:
             return True
 
     # Check filename against known sensitive files.
-    for pat in _SENSITIVE_FILE_PATTERNS:
-        if pat in filenames:
-            return True
-
-    return False
+    return filename in _SENSITIVE_FILE_PATTERNS_CF
 
 
 def _tool_path_roots() -> list[str]:

src/tool_schemas.py

@@ -565,8 +565,8 @@ FUNCTION_TOOL_SCHEMAS = [
                     "uid": {"type": "string", "description": "Event UID (for update/delete)"},
                     "calendar_href": {"type": "string", "description": "Specific calendar URL (optional; defaults to first calendar)"},
                     "calendar": {"type": "string", "description": "Filter list_events by calendar name or href"},
-                    "start": {"type": "string", "description": "list_events range start (ISO datetime); defaults to today. Prefer start; backend also accepts start_date, range_start, from, dtstart, since."},
-                    "end": {"type": "string", "description": "list_events range end (ISO datetime); defaults to +14 days. Prefer end; backend also accepts end_date, range_end, to, dtend, until."},
+                    "start": {"type": "string", "description": "list_events range start (ISO datetime). Use this for month/week requests after resolving the date range; do not pass a loose query string. Prefer start; backend also accepts start_time, start_date, range_start, from, dtstart, since."},
+                    "end": {"type": "string", "description": "list_events range end (ISO datetime). Use this for month/week requests after resolving the date range; defaults to +14 days only when no range is requested. Prefer end; backend also accepts end_time, end_date, range_end, to, dtend, until."},
                     "event_type": {"type": "string", "description": "Tag / category for the event. Common values: work, personal, health, travel, meal, social, admin, other. Aliases accepted: tag, category, type."},
                     "importance": {"type": "string", "enum": ["low", "normal", "high", "critical"], "description": "Priority level (defaults to 'normal')"},
                     "reminder_minutes": {"type": "integer", "description": "For create_event: create an Odysseus reminder this many minutes before the event, e.g. 5 for 'reminder 5 min before'."},

src/tool_utils.py

@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ def _parse_tool_args(content):
     if isinstance(content, str):
         try:
             args = json.loads(content) if content.strip() else {}
+            if not isinstance(args, dict):
+                args = {}
         except (json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError) as e:
             raise ValueError(str(e))
     elif isinstance(content, dict):

src/tools/calendar.py

@@ -208,11 +208,20 @@ async def do_manage_calendar(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
         elif action == "list_events":
             try:
                 start_raw = _first_nonempty_arg(
-                    "start", "start_date", "range_start", "from", "dtstart", "since"
+                    "start", "start_time", "start_date", "range_start", "from", "dtstart", "since"
                 )
                 end_raw = _first_nonempty_arg(
-                    "end", "end_date", "range_end", "to", "dtend", "until"
+                    "end", "end_time", "end_date", "range_end", "to", "dtend", "until"
                 )
+                query_raw = args.get("query") or args.get("date_range") or args.get("range")
+                if query_raw and (not start_raw or not end_raw):
+                    return {
+                        "error": (
+                            "list_events needs explicit start/end ISO datetimes; "
+                            f"resolve the requested range ({query_raw!r}) and call manage_calendar again."
+                        ),
+                        "exit_code": 1,
+                    }
                 if start_raw:
                     start_dt = _parse_dt(start_raw)
                 else:

src/webhook_manager.py

@@ -7,10 +7,12 @@ import ipaddress
 import json
 import logging
 import re
+import ssl
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 from typing import Optional
 from urllib.parse import urlparse
 
+import httpcore
 import httpx
 
 from src.database import SessionLocal, Webhook
@@ -125,6 +127,128 @@ def validate_webhook_url(url: str) -> str:
     return url
 
 
+def _validated_public_ips(url: str) -> list:
+    """Resolve *url*'s host and return its IPs, raising ValueError if any is
+    private/internal.
+
+    ``validate_webhook_url`` resolves the host to decide accept/reject, but the
+    subsequent ``httpx`` connect re-resolves independently — so a DNS record
+    that flips between the two lookups (rebinding) can slip an internal IP past
+    the check. Callers pin the delivery connection to the IP this function
+    returns, closing that TOCTOU. Fail closed: an unresolvable or partly-private
+    result raises rather than returning a usable IP.
+    """
+    parsed = urlparse(url)
+    hostname = (parsed.hostname or "").strip()
+    if not hostname:
+        raise ValueError("URL must have a hostname")
+    try:
+        literal = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)
+    except ValueError:
+        literal = None
+    if literal is not None:
+        if _ip_is_private(literal):
+            raise ValueError("URL must not point to private/internal addresses")
+        return [literal]
+    addrs = _resolve_hostname_ips(hostname)
+    if not addrs or any(_ip_is_private(a) for a in addrs):
+        raise ValueError("URL must not point to private/internal addresses")
+    return addrs
+
+
+# httpcore raises its own exception hierarchy; map the ones a simple POST can
+# surface back to their httpx equivalents so callers' `except httpx.*` blocks
+# (and sanitize_error) behave exactly as they did with the default transport.
+_HTTPCORE_TO_HTTPX_EXC = {
+    httpcore.ConnectError: httpx.ConnectError,
+    httpcore.ConnectTimeout: httpx.ConnectTimeout,
+    httpcore.NetworkError: httpx.NetworkError,
+    httpcore.PoolTimeout: httpx.PoolTimeout,
+    httpcore.ProtocolError: httpx.ProtocolError,
+    httpcore.ReadError: httpx.ReadError,
+    httpcore.ReadTimeout: httpx.ReadTimeout,
+    httpcore.RemoteProtocolError: httpx.RemoteProtocolError,
+    httpcore.TimeoutException: httpx.TimeoutException,
+    httpcore.WriteError: httpx.WriteError,
+    httpcore.WriteTimeout: httpx.WriteTimeout,
+}
+
+
+class _PinnedAsyncBackend(httpcore.AsyncNetworkBackend):
+    """Async network backend that routes every TCP connect to a fixed IP.
+
+    httpcore derives TLS SNI and the ``Host`` header from the request URL, not
+    from the connect host, so pinning only the socket destination keeps
+    certificate validation and vhost routing pointed at the original hostname.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, ip: ipaddress._BaseAddress):
+        self._ip = str(ip)
+        self._real = httpcore.AnyIOBackend()
+
+    async def connect_tcp(self, host, port, timeout=None, local_address=None,
+                          socket_options=None):
+        return await self._real.connect_tcp(
+            self._ip, port, timeout, local_address, socket_options
+        )
+
+    async def connect_unix_socket(self, path, timeout=None, socket_options=None):
+        return await self._real.connect_unix_socket(path, timeout, socket_options)
+
+    async def sleep(self, seconds: float) -> None:
+        return await self._real.sleep(seconds)
+
+
+class _PinnedAsyncTransport(httpx.AsyncBaseTransport):
+    """httpx transport that pins the TCP connect to a pre-resolved public IP.
+
+    Uses only public ``httpcore`` / ``httpx`` APIs. The request URL is passed
+    through unchanged (Host + SNI stay the original hostname); only the socket
+    destination is pinned, closing the DNS-rebinding TOCTOU between the SSRF
+    check and the connect. HTTP/1.1 only — webhook deliveries are small POSTs.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, ip: ipaddress._BaseAddress):
+        self._pool = httpcore.AsyncConnectionPool(
+            ssl_context=ssl.create_default_context(),
+            http1=True,
+            http2=False,
+            network_backend=_PinnedAsyncBackend(ip),
+        )
+
+    async def handle_async_request(self, request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
+        core_req = httpcore.Request(
+            method=request.method,
+            url=httpcore.URL(
+                scheme=request.url.raw_scheme,
+                host=request.url.raw_host,
+                port=request.url.port,
+                target=request.url.raw_path,
+            ),
+            headers=request.headers.raw,
+            content=request.stream,
+            extensions=request.extensions,
+        )
+        try:
+            core_resp = await self._pool.handle_async_request(core_req)
+            content = b"".join([chunk async for chunk in core_resp.aiter_stream()])
+            await core_resp.aclose()
+        except Exception as exc:
+            mapped = _HTTPCORE_TO_HTTPX_EXC.get(type(exc))
+            if mapped is not None:
+                raise mapped(str(exc)) from exc
+            raise
+        return httpx.Response(
+            status_code=core_resp.status,
+            headers=core_resp.headers,
+            content=content,
+            extensions=core_resp.extensions,
+        )
+
+    async def aclose(self) -> None:
+        await self._pool.aclose()
+
+
 def validate_events(events_str: str) -> str:
     """Validate comma-separated event names. Returns cleaned string."""
     events = [e.strip() for e in events_str.split(",") if e.strip()]
@@ -198,8 +322,11 @@ def sanitize_error(error: str, max_len: int = 200) -> str:
 
 class WebhookManager:
     def __init__(self, api_key_manager=None):
-        # Disable redirects to prevent SSRF via redirect chains
-        self._client = httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10, follow_redirects=False)
+        # No shared client: each delivery builds a short-lived client whose
+        # transport is pinned to the SSRF-approved IP (see _deliver /
+        # _send_request), so a single reusable client can't be pointed at
+        # different pinned hosts. Redirects stay disabled on every delivery
+        # client to prevent SSRF via redirect chains.
         self._loop: Optional[asyncio.AbstractEventLoop] = None
         self._api_key_manager = api_key_manager
         # Strong references to in-flight fire-and-forget tasks. asyncio only
@@ -262,11 +389,28 @@ class WebhookManager:
         decrypted = self._decrypt_secret(encrypted_secret)
         await self._deliver(webhook_id, url, decrypted, "webhook.test", {"message": "Test ping from Odysseus"})
 
+    async def _send_request(self, url: str, body: str, headers: dict,
+                            ip: ipaddress._BaseAddress) -> httpx.Response:
+        """POST *body* to *url* with the TCP connect pinned to *ip*.
+
+        Overridable seam: tests replace this to avoid real sockets. Redirects
+        are disabled so a 3xx can't bounce the delivery to another host.
+        """
+        transport = _PinnedAsyncTransport(ip)
+        async with httpx.AsyncClient(
+            timeout=10, follow_redirects=False, transport=transport,
+        ) as client:
+            return await client.post(url, content=body, headers=headers)
+
     async def _deliver(self, webhook_id: str, url: str, secret: Optional[str], event: str, payload: dict):
         """Internal delivery. Never call directly from outside this class (use deliver_test)."""
-        # Re-validate URL at delivery time in case DB was tampered with
+        # Re-validate URL at delivery time in case DB was tampered with, and
+        # capture the exact IPs that passed the check so the connect can be
+        # pinned to one of them (closes the DNS-rebinding TOCTOU: the check
+        # below and the socket connect no longer resolve independently).
         try:
             validate_webhook_url(url)
+            pinned_ips = _validated_public_ips(url)
         except ValueError as e:
             logger.warning(f"Webhook {webhook_id} has invalid URL, skipping: {e}")
             return
@@ -283,7 +427,7 @@ class WebhookManager:
 
         db = SessionLocal()
         try:
-            resp = await self._client.post(url, content=body, headers=headers)
+            resp = await self._send_request(url, body, headers, pinned_ips[0])
             db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == webhook_id).update({
                 "last_triggered_at": _utcnow(),
                 "last_status_code": resp.status_code,
@@ -305,4 +449,7 @@ class WebhookManager:
             db.close()
 
     async def close(self):
-        await self._client.aclose()
+        # Delivery clients are per-request and closed via their async context
+        # manager, so there is no long-lived client to tear down here. Kept for
+        # API compatibility with callers (e.g. app shutdown).
+        return None