mirror of
https://github.com/pewdiepie-archdaemon/odysseus.git
synced 2026-07-09 12:07:18 +00:00
fix/native-agent-loop-guard-signals
11 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 botinate
|
69b9bb0869 |
fix(agent): execute fenced tool calls with inline args and route bare email tool names (#3681)
* fix(agent): execute fenced tool calls with inline args and bare email tool names
Two bugs made local (Ollama) models unable to use email tools, leaving
raw fences like ```list_email_accounts {}``` in the chat:
1. _TOOL_BLOCK_RE required a newline right after the fence tag, so a
tool call with args on the same line ("```list_email_accounts {}")
never matched and was never executed. The fence now matches with
optional spaces/newline after the tag.
2. Even when parsed, bare email tool names had no dispatch branch in
tool_execution.py and fell through to "Unknown tool type". They now
route to the email MCP server as mcp__email__<name>, matching how
function_call_to_tool_block already maps them for native callers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(security): block all bare email tool names for non-admins; harden fence-tag regex
Review follow-up on #3681 (thanks @vgalin):
1. Routing bare email names made 10 of the 14 email tools executable by
non-admin owners — is_public_blocked_tool() runs on the bare name
before dispatch, and NON_ADMIN_BLOCKED_TOOLS only listed 4. Define the
full email tool set once (BUILTIN_EMAIL_TOOLS in tool_security.py) and
derive the blocklist, the fence tags (TOOL_TAGS), the bare-name
dispatch, and the native-call mapping from it so they can't drift.
This also fixes 4 tools (search_emails, draft_email, draft_email_reply,
ai_draft_email_reply) that were missing from the old tool_schemas copy
and therefore unreachable even for native function-calling models.
2. The relaxed fence regex from the previous commit could prefix-match
longer fence tags: ```python3 parsed as tool "python" with content
"3\nprint(...)" and executed as code. Add a (?![\w-]) boundary after
the tag.
Tests: test_public_agent_policy_blocks_sensitive_tools now covers all 14
bare email names + the mcp__email__ form; new tests/test_fenced_inline_args.py
pins inline-args parsing, the python3/hyphenated-tag non-matches, and
strip/parse display mirroring.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(security): gate bare and mcp-qualified email names together; stop executing Markdown info strings
Review follow-up on #3681 (thanks @RaresKeY):
1. P1: execute_tool_block() checked disabled_tools / the turn ToolPolicy
only against the incoming block name, then the bare-email branch
qualified it to mcp__email__<name> and called the MCP manager. Plan
mode and the MCP settings toggle write the QUALIFIED name into the
denylist, so a bare fence like ```list_emails``` sailed past a
mcp__email__list_emails entry. Both gates now match on both
spellings (bare <-> mcp__email__-qualified), in either direction.
2. P2: the relaxed fence regex accepted arbitrary same-line text after
a recognized tag, which made ordinary Markdown info strings
executable: ```python title="example.py" ran as a python tool call.
Same-line content now only counts as tool input when it starts with
{ or [ (JSON args); anything else leaves the fence as display text,
and strip_tool_blocks mirrors that (the fence stays visible).
Tests: disabled-tools alias regression (qualified entry blocks bare
name and vice versa, never reaching the MCP manager), ToolPolicy alias
regression, python/bash title="..." non-execution + display retention,
and inline JSON-array args still parsing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(security): reject brace-style fence metadata; cover the full email set in the friendly toggle
Review follow-up round 3 on #3681 (thanks @RaresKeY):
1. Brace-style fence metadata no longer executes. The previous narrowing
still treated any same-line {/[ after a recognized tag as tool input,
so ```bash {title="setup"} ran as a bash call. The fence header is now
captured separately and judged by one predicate shared between
parse_tool_blocks and strip_tool_blocks (_fenced_tool_call), so the
execute and display decisions can't disagree: same-line content only
counts as inline args when the tag is NOT a code tag (bash/python
never take same-line args — that text is Markdown fence attributes)
AND the inline text (plus any continuation lines) parses as standalone
JSON. ```bash {title="setup"}, ```python {"title":"example.py"} and
```list_emails {title="x"} all stay visible and inert.
2. The friendly `disable_tool email` toggle covered 3 of the 14 email
tools (mcp__email__{list_emails,read_email,send_email}); the other
bare aliases this PR routes stayed executable after an operator
disabled email. The alias now derives from BUILTIN_EMAIL_TOOLS in
BOTH spellings — bare (function-schema hiding, bare-fence dispatch)
and mcp__email__* (MCP schema hiding, qualified runtime blocks) —
so the toggle and the runtime gate can't drift apart.
Tests: brace/bracket metadata regressions for parse and strip symmetry
(code tags, invalid-JSON inline on a JSON tool, multi-line inline JSON
still parsing), and disable_tool/enable_tool email covering all 14 names
in both spellings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(email): close remaining email-tool registry drift; classify every email tool for plan mode
Deep self-review follow-up on #3681. Three review rounds each found another
hand-maintained copy of the email tool list that had drifted; this commit
hunts down ALL remaining copies and pins them to BUILTIN_EMAIL_TOOLS.
The same 5 tools (search_emails, draft_email, draft_email_reply,
ai_draft_email_reply, download_attachment) were missing from every
advertising surface, so they were dispatchable but never offered:
- FUNCTION_TOOL_SCHEMAS: native function-calling models never saw them
(the round-1 fix covered dispatch only); schemas added, mirroring the
email server's inputSchema definitions.
- TOOL_SECTIONS: fenced-block models were never told about them; prompt
sections added.
- tool_index: absent from the RAG embedding registry (never retrievable),
the email keyword hints, and the scheduled assistant's always-available
set — the latter two now derive from BUILTIN_EMAIL_TOOLS.
- agent_loop._DOMAIN_TOOL_MAP["email"], tool_policy._COMMON_TOOL_NAMES,
the assistant tool-selector UI groups (assistant.js), and the default
Assistant crew seed (task_scheduler) now derive from / cover the set.
Plan mode now classifies every email tool explicitly:
- list_email_accounts and search_emails join PLAN_MODE_READONLY_TOOLS.
Without this, list_email_accounts sat in the plan-mode bare denylist
(schema-derived) while its qualified form passed the MCP read-only
filter — and the round-2 bare/qualified alias gate would have blocked
the qualified call too, regressing read-only email discovery in plan
mode.
- draft_email, draft_email_reply, ai_draft_email_reply, and
download_attachment join the fail-closed mutator backstop (drafts
create documents; download_attachment writes to disk).
Tests: tests/test_email_registry_sync.py pins every registry (including
the email server source and assistant.js) to BUILTIN_EMAIL_TOOLS and
asserts the plan-mode partition, so the next email tool can't drift; a
parse/strip mirror grid covers 192 fence shapes (tag x header x body)
asserting executed <=> stripped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: move the email alias rule into tool_security; extract the assistant seed constant
Code-quality pass over the PR's own changes:
- The bare<->qualified email aliasing rule lived inline in the generic
dispatcher (_execute_tool_block_impl). It is policy knowledge, so it
moves next to BUILTIN_EMAIL_TOOLS as email_tool_policy_names(); the
dispatcher just consumes it, and the rule gets its own unit test
(including the mcp__email__<not-a-tool> and mcp__other__ non-alias
cases).
- The default Assistant's enabled_tools list was an inline literal
inside the CrewMember seed, and its registry-sync test asserted a
source-code substring. Extracted to DEFAULT_ASSISTANT_ENABLED_TOOLS
so the test imports and checks the actual value.
- _fenced_tool_call return type tightened to Optional[Tuple[str, str]].
No behavior change; suite green (3295 passed).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* revert: move the email registry consolidation to a follow-up PR
Per review feedback on scope, this PR stays narrow: fenced inline-args
parsing, bare email tool routing, and the directly required safety
gates. This commit reverts the registry/advertising consolidation from
|
||
|
Kenny Van de Maele
|
cdae9879f2 |
feat(agent): add manage_bg_jobs tool to inspect and kill background bash jobs (#4577)
Detached bash jobs (#!bg) could be launched and auto-reported on completion, but the agent had no way to act on a running one: no on-demand output read and no kill (it blocked until the 1h max-runtime). bg_jobs had the pieces (_read_output, list_for_session, internal _kill) but none was exposed. Adds: - bg_jobs.kill(job_id): tears down the process tree, marks the job killed, and sets followed_up so the monitor does not also auto-continue a deliberate kill. - manage_bg_jobs registry tool with actions list / output / kill, scoped to the chat that launched the job (cross-session access reads as not found). - Wiring: TOOL_HANDLERS/TAGS, function schema, RAG index + keyword hints, parser name map, dispatch (threads session_id via _direct_fallback). Gated like bash (NON_ADMIN_BLOCKED_TOOLS; plan-mode mutator). - agent_loop: background-job intent regex maps to the files domain (and the tool joins _DOMAIN_TOOL_MAP[files]) so short commands like 'kill that job' are not dropped by the low-signal gate that skips tool retrieval. - bg launch message tells the model to call manage_bg_jobs itself for check/stop rather than printing raw tool syntax to the user. Tests: tests/test_bg_job_tools.py (kill semantics, per-chat scoping, actions, and the intent classifier). |
||
|
RaresKeY
|
a7766d0b7f |
fix(agent): honor auth-disabled tool access after setup
Check explicit auth-disabled mode before configured-admin ownership checks so single-user mode keeps full agent tool access after setup. |
||
|
Kenny Van de Maele
|
620fdd0859 |
feat(agent): confine agent file/shell tools to a selectable workspace (#3665)
* feat(agent): workspace confinement via context-local binding + get_workspace tool Bind the per-turn workspace once in execute_tool_block; the shared path resolvers (_resolve_tool_path / _resolve_search_root) and the subprocess cwd helper (agent_cwd) read it, so file tools + bash/python are confined centrally and a new tool that uses the shared helpers cannot accidentally bypass it. Adds the admin-gated /api/workspace/browse picker, a workspace pill + directory modal (reusing existing modal/button CSS), the /workspace slash command, and a get_workspace tool (replaces a system-prompt block). Confinement is OS-agnostic (realpath/normcase/commonpath) and docker-safe (container paths, no host assumptions). Reopens #2023. * ux(workspace): clarify workspace is not a sandbox Picker modal note + pill tooltip + get_workspace tool/output wording now state plainly: read_file/write_file/edit_file/grep/glob/ls are confined to the folder, but bash/python only start there (cwd) and are not sandboxed. Modal note reuses the existing .muted class. * fix(agent): treat an active workspace as file-work intent A vague low-signal message (e.g. "look at the local project") matches no domain keywords, so tool retrieval is skipped and only always-available tools are offered — leaving the agent with no file access even though a workspace is set. When a workspace is active, include the file/code tools (incl. get_workspace) on low-signal turns so the agent can act on the folder. Also requires the tool index (ChromaDB) to be reachable for normal retrieval; that is an environment dependency, not part of this change. * ux(workspace): hide pill + overflow entry in chat mode Workspace only scopes the agent's file/shell tools, so the pill and the overflow 'Workspace' entry are agent-only now — hidden in chat mode like the bash toggle. Mode read from the DOM in syncWorkspaceIndicator; applyMode() is called from the agent/chat setMode handler. * prompt(tools): steer bash/python to defer to the dedicated file tools bash/python schema descriptions (what native-tool-calling models read) were bare and gave no steer, so models would do file ops via the shell (e.g. writing SVG/HTML, which then dumps raw markup into the tool preview). Tell bash/python in the schema + tool-index + prompt section to prefer read_file/write_file/ edit_file/grep/glob/ls and only be used for what those do not cover. * prompt(tools): keep bash/python deferral generic (no hardcoded tool names) Reference 'a dedicated tool' rather than listing read_file/write_file/grep/etc. by name, so the guidance does not go stale if those tools are renamed. * style(workspace): drop em-dashes from added code comments/strings * ux(workspace): terser non-sandbox note in picker (no tool-name list) * ux(workspace): mirror terse non-sandbox wording in pill tooltip * chore: untrack local venv symlink (run-only, not part of the feature) * prompt(workspace): keep get_workspace text generic (no hardcoded tool names) * fix(agent): low-signal + workspace surfaces only read-only file tools Intersect the files tool group with PLAN_MODE_READONLY_TOOLS so a vague message in a workspace exposes read_file/grep/glob/ls/get_workspace for exploration, but not write_file/edit_file/bash/python -- those wait for a request that actually calls for them (RAG retrieval still adds them on a real ask). * feat(workspace): cap browse listing at 500 dirs with a truncated hint Mirror the filesystem_tools._CODENAV_MAX_HITS pattern with a module-local _MAX_BROWSE_DIRS so a directory with thousands of children does not dump every row into the picker; the response carries a truncated flag and the modal tells the user to type a path to jump in. * chore: untrack local venv symlink (run-only artifact) * fix(workspace): vet the workspace root against the sensitive-path deny list at bind time The in-workspace resolver deny-lists sensitive paths inside the workspace, but the empty-path search root is the workspace itself, so a workspace of ~/.ssh could be listed via ls with no path. vet_workspace() (public, in tool_execution next to the resolvers) rejects non-directories and sensitive roots before the path is ever bound; chat_routes uses it instead of its inline isdir check. * fix(workspace): reject filesystem roots and stop showing rejected workspaces as active Review findings from #3665: P2: vet_workspace accepted / (and would accept drive/UNC roots), which makes every absolute path 'inside' the workspace and collapses confinement into host-wide file access. A root is its own dirname, so reject when dirname(resolved) == resolved; the browse response now carries a selectable flag and the picker disables 'Use this folder' on unselectable dirs. P3: /workspace set stored any string client-side and the chat route silently dropped rejected values, so the pill could claim a confinement that was not in effect. New admin-gated /api/workspace/vet validates manual paths before they persist (canonical path returned), and when a posted workspace is rejected at send time the stream emits workspace_rejected so the client clears the stored value and toasts instead of continuing silently. * fix(workspace): check caller privilege before vetting the posted workspace Review finding: /api/chat_stream called vet_workspace() on the posted value for every caller and emitted workspace_rejected on failure, so a non-admin who can chat but cannot use file/shell tools could distinguish existing directories from missing/file/sensitive/root paths by whether the event appeared. The resolution now lives in _resolve_request_workspace, which drops the submitted value uniformly for non-admin callers, with no vetting and no event, before the path ever touches the filesystem. Admin and single-user behavior is unchanged. Test pins that valid and invalid paths are indistinguishable for a non-admin and that vet_workspace is never invoked for them. |
||
|
SurprisedDuck
|
e115b0155c |
fix(security): don't grant tool access in the pre-setup window (#3506)
* fix(security): don't grant tool access in the pre-setup window owner_is_admin_or_single_user() returned True whenever auth was not configured, which conflated two very different states: - intentional single-user mode (operator set AUTH_ENABLED=false), and - the pre-setup window (auth enabled, but no admin created yet). In the second state, blocked_tools_for_owner() returned an empty set, so server-execution tools (bash/python) and other admin-only tools were ungated. The auth middleware already 401s /api/ requests pre-setup, but a caller that bypasses it (trusted loopback / internal-tool path) could reach those tools before setup completed. Treat "not configured" as admin only when auth is intentionally disabled (AUTH_ENABLED=false), mirroring the AUTH_ENABLED parsing in app.py and core.middleware. Single-user mode is preserved; the pre-setup window is now non-admin as defense-in-depth. Adds regression tests for both states. Fixes #3201 Supported by Claude Opus 4.8 * refactor(security): reuse _auth_disabled() instead of a duplicate helper Addresses review on #3506: src/auth_helpers.py already has _auth_disabled() with the identical AUTH_ENABLED parse. Drop the duplicate _auth_intentionally_disabled() and call the existing helper via a lazy import inside owner_is_admin_or_single_user (mirroring the lazy core.auth import) to avoid any import cycle. Removes the now-unused `import os`. Behaviour and the two regression tests are unchanged. Supported by Claude Opus 4.8 --------- Co-authored-by: SurprisedDuck <288741682+SurprisedDuck@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
Kenny Van de Maele
|
8ce945d338 |
feat: Add plan mode to the chat agent (#638)
* feat: Add plan mode to the chat agent
Adds a plan mode: the agent investigates read-only, proposes a checklist, and
waits for approval before changing anything. On approval it runs with full
tools and checks items off as it goes. Enforcement reuses the existing
disabled_tools gate.
Includes a slash command: `/plan [on|off]` (and `/toggle plan`) to flip the
plan toggle from the chat input.
- src/tool_security.py, src/mcp_manager.py: read-only allowlist (tools + MCP).
- src/agent_loop.py, routes/chat_routes.py: union the disabled set, prepend the
plan directive, force agent mode.
- static/: plan toggle pill, Approve & Run, dockable plan window, task-list
checkboxes, and the /plan slash command.
- tests/test_plan_mode.py.
* Plan mode: persistent re-referenceable plan + agent write-back
Three improvements so a long plan survives a weak model and stays in reach:
1. Re-reference the plan (out-of-context fix). On the execution turn the frontend
sends the approved checklist back (`approved_plan`); the backend pins it as a
top-of-context `## ACTIVE PLAN` system note (kept by the context trimmer), so
the agent can always re-read the plan instead of losing the thread on a long
run. New `build_active_plan_note()` (unit-tested).
2. Re-open / dock the plan anytime. The plan checklist is stored per-session
(localStorage). When a plan exists, the plan-mode button opens a small menu
("Show plan" / "Plan mode: On/Off") that re-opens the side-dockable plan
window — so it can stay docked while the agent works. The window live-refreshes
as the plan changes.
3. Agent write-back: new `update_plan` tool. The agent calls it to tick steps
`- [x]` after finishing them, or to revise steps when the user asks. Marker
tool (no I/O) → `plan_update` SSE event → the stored plan + docked window
update live. The ACTIVE PLAN note instructs the agent to use it.
Backend: src/agent_loop.py (param + pin + note builder + emit + prompt blurb),
src/tool_execution.py (update_plan handler), routes/chat_routes.py (parse
`approved_plan`, relay `plan_update`), registration in tool_schemas / agent_tools
/ tool_index (always-available, not admin-gated).
Frontend: static/js/chat.js (plan store, send `approved_plan`, handle
`plan_update`, capture restated checklists), static/app.js (plan-button menu),
static/js/planWindow.js (`isPlanWindowOpen`), static/js/storage.js (PLAN key).
Tests: tests/test_plan_mode.py (plan-note), tests/test_update_plan_tool.py.
* Plan mode: drop bash/python, rely on read-only discovery tools
Shell can mutate (write files, hit the network) and can't be constrained to
read-only at the tool layer, so plan mode no longer relies on a prompt to keep
it well-behaved — bash/python are removed from the read-only allowlist and added
to the fail-closed block set. Discovery is covered by the dedicated read-only
tools (read_file, grep, glob, ls) instead.
Rewrites the plan-mode directive to state shell is disabled and lists the
available read-only tools positively. Addresses review feedback on #638.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Comment: note _MCP_READONLY_VERBS are prefixes not whole words
Clarifies that entries like "summar" are intentional stems matched via
startswith (covers summarise/summarize/summary), not typos. Addresses review
feedback on #638.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Plan mode: clarify why gating inverts the allowlist into a denylist
Rename _PLAN_MODE_FALLBACK_BLOCK -> _PLAN_MODE_KNOWN_MUTATORS and rewrite the
comments. The tool gate is a denylist (disabled_tools); plan mode's policy is an
allowlist, so it returns the inverse (all known tool names minus the allowlist).
The static mutator set is a backstop for the schema-derived name list, which
misses XML-only tools and can fail to import. Addresses review feedback on #638.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Plan mode: stop hardcoding the read-only tool list in the directive
The model is already shown its available (read-only) tools by _assemble_prompt,
which removes every disabled tool. Enumerating them again in the directive only
duplicated that list and would drift as tools change. Point at the tools listed
below instead. Addresses review feedback on #638.
|
||
|
Kenny Van de Maele
|
1f00fff837 |
feat: add code-navigation tools (grep, glob, ls) + read_file line ranges (#1670)
Gives the agent first-class code navigation instead of shelling out via bash (token-heavy, unreliable on weaker models, unstructured). Mirrors the Grep/Glob/Read primitives that Claude Code / opencode expose. - grep: regex search over file contents across a tree. Uses ripgrep when available (with explicit excludes so junk dirs are skipped even without a .gitignore); falls back to a pure-Python walk+regex when rg is absent. Returns file:line:match, capped. - glob: find files by glob pattern (recursive), newest first. - ls: list a directory (folders first, then files with sizes). - read_file: optional offset/limit for line-range reads of large files (plain-path calls stay back-compatible). All confined by the same path policy as read_file (_resolve_tool_path: data/tmp allowlist + sensitive-file deny). Junk dirs (.git, node_modules, venv, __pycache__, dist/build, …) skipped. Output capped (200 hits, 400 chars/line). Admin-gated like the other filesystem tools. Wiring: schemas + native arg->content serializer (src/tool_schemas.py), tool tags (src/agent_tools.py), always-available + descriptions (src/tool_index.py), admin gate (src/tool_security.py), dispatch + impls (src/tool_execution.py). Tests: tests/test_code_nav_tools.py — match/skip-junk/ignore-case/glob-filter, allowlist rejection, glob/ls, read-range, and the no-ripgrep Python fallback. |
||
|
Kenny Van de Maele
|
7443c36bd9 |
feat: Add edit_file tool + file-change diffs (#1239)
* Add edit_file tool + file-change diffs
edit_file is an exact old_string -> new_string replacement on a file on disk
(fails if old_string is missing or non-unique unless replace_all); write_file
also returns a unified diff. Diffs render collapsed in the tool bubble
(filename + +adds/-dels, theme colors); the raw JSON command box is hidden.
Security: edit_file is a sensitive filesystem-write tool, treated everywhere
write_file is —
- added to NON_ADMIN_BLOCKED_TOOLS (is_public_blocked_tool / blocked_tools_for_owner),
so on auth-enabled deployments a non-admin cannot run it; execute_tool_block
refuses it for non-admin owners.
- confined by the same path policy as read_file/write_file (allowlist +
sensitive-file deny) via _resolve_tool_path.
Disambiguation in tool descriptions + bash prompt: edit_file/write_file are the
only way to write files (they show a diff) — never edit_document (editor panel)
or a bash heredoc/redirect.
Tests (tests/test_edit_file.py): non-admin block (policy + execution gate),
successful edit, not-found old_string, non-unique old_string (+ replace_all),
and path outside the allowed roots.
Files: src/tool_execution.py, src/agent_loop.py, src/tool_schemas.py,
src/agent_tools.py, src/tool_index.py, static/js/chat.js, static/style.css,
tests/test_edit_file.py.
* Drop redundant import os in write_file closure
os is already imported at module top.
|
||
|
Afonso Coutinho
|
1453458519 |
fix: is_public_blocked_tool crashes on a truthy non-string tool name (#1620)
* fix: is_public_blocked_tool crashes on a truthy non-string tool name * fix: is_public_blocked_tool fails closed (blocks) on a malformed non-string tool name |
||
|
Refuse
|
4218bfe71e |
Tools: restrict app_api and serve_preset to admins
Co-authored-by: RefuseOdd <refuseodd@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
pewdiepie-archdaemon
|
e5c99a5eee | Odysseus v1.0 |