"""Path-confinement regression tests for research routes. Covers the CodeQL py/path-injection alert cluster (#552-#567) in routes/research/research_routes.py: - _owns_in_memory disk fallback (alerts #552, #553) - _assert_owns_research (alerts #554, #555) - research_detail (alerts #556, #557) - research_archive (alerts #558, #559, #560) - research_delete (alerts #561, #562, #563) - research_result_peek (alerts #564, #565) - research_spinoff (alerts #566, #567) """ import asyncio import json from types import SimpleNamespace from unittest.mock import MagicMock import pytest from fastapi import HTTPException from routes.research_routes import setup_research_routes from routes.research.research_routes import _confine_research_path @pytest.fixture(autouse=True) def _redirect_research_dir(tmp_path, monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setattr( "routes.research_routes.DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR", str(tmp_path / "deep_research"), ) def _request(user: str): return SimpleNamespace(state=SimpleNamespace(current_user=user)) def _route(router, path: str, method: str): for route in router.routes: if getattr(route, "path", "") != path: continue if method in getattr(route, "methods", set()): return route.endpoint raise AssertionError(f"{method} {path} route not registered") def _write_research(data_dir, session_id: str, **data): data_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) path = data_dir / f"{session_id}.json" path.write_text(json.dumps(data), encoding="utf-8") return path def _research_handler(): handler = MagicMock() handler._active_tasks = {} return handler # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Helper-level tests — _confine_research_path # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- def test_confine_allows_valid_session_id(tmp_path, monkeypatch): data_dir = tmp_path / "deep_research" data_dir.mkdir() monkeypatch.setattr("routes.research_routes.DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR", str(data_dir)) path = _confine_research_path("rp-abc123de4567") assert path == (data_dir / "rp-abc123de4567.json").resolve() @pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_id", [ "../escape", "../../etc/passwd", "/etc/passwd", "safe/../../x", "", "rp_bad", # underscore not in allowed charset "rp-bad.json", # dot not in allowed charset "a" * 129, # exceeds length limit ]) def test_confine_rejects_bad_session_ids(tmp_path, monkeypatch, bad_id): data_dir = tmp_path / "deep_research" data_dir.mkdir() monkeypatch.setattr("routes.research_routes.DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR", str(data_dir)) with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc: _confine_research_path(bad_id) assert exc.value.status_code == 400 def test_confine_rejects_symlink_escape(tmp_path, monkeypatch): """A symlink inside DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR that resolves outside is rejected.""" data_dir = tmp_path / "deep_research" outside = tmp_path / "outside" data_dir.mkdir() outside.mkdir() monkeypatch.setattr("routes.research_routes.DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR", str(data_dir)) target = outside / "rp-linktest1234.json" target.write_text("{}", encoding="utf-8") link = data_dir / "rp-linktest1234.json" try: link.symlink_to(target) except (AttributeError, NotImplementedError, OSError) as e: pytest.skip(f"symlinks unavailable: {e}") with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc: _confine_research_path("rp-linktest1234") assert exc.value.status_code == 400 # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Route-level tests — valid paths work # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- def test_detail_returns_data_for_owner(tmp_path): data_dir = tmp_path / "deep_research" _write_research(data_dir, "rp-validid12345", owner="alice", query="valid query") router = setup_research_routes(_research_handler()) target = _route(router, "/api/research/detail/{session_id}", "GET") out = asyncio.run(target(session_id="rp-validid12345", request=_request("alice"))) assert out["query"] == "valid query" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Route-level tests — traversal and injection rejected # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- _TRAVERSAL_IDS = [ "../escape", "../../etc/passwd", "/etc/passwd", "safe/../../x", "rp_under", "a" * 129, ] @pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_id", _TRAVERSAL_IDS) def test_detail_rejects_traversal(bad_id): router = setup_research_routes(_research_handler()) target = _route(router, "/api/research/detail/{session_id}", "GET") with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc: asyncio.run(target(session_id=bad_id, request=_request("alice"))) assert exc.value.status_code == 400 @pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_id", _TRAVERSAL_IDS) def test_archive_rejects_traversal(bad_id): router = setup_research_routes(_research_handler()) target = _route(router, "/api/research/{session_id}/archive", "POST") with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc: asyncio.run(target(session_id=bad_id, request=_request("alice"), archived=True)) assert exc.value.status_code == 400 @pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_id", _TRAVERSAL_IDS) def test_delete_rejects_traversal(bad_id): router = setup_research_routes(_research_handler()) target = _route(router, "/api/research/{session_id}", "DELETE") with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc: asyncio.run(target(session_id=bad_id, request=_request("alice"))) assert exc.value.status_code == 400 # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Route-level tests — traversal does not touch files outside DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- def test_delete_traversal_does_not_delete_outside_file(tmp_path, monkeypatch): data_dir = tmp_path / "deep_research" data_dir.mkdir(parents=True) outside = tmp_path / "sensitive.json" outside.write_text('{"secret": true}', encoding="utf-8") monkeypatch.setattr("routes.research_routes.DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR", str(data_dir)) router = setup_research_routes(_research_handler()) target = _route(router, "/api/research/{session_id}", "DELETE") with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc: asyncio.run(target(session_id="../sensitive", request=_request("alice"))) assert exc.value.status_code == 400 assert outside.exists(), "file outside DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR must not be deleted" def test_archive_traversal_does_not_mutate_outside_file(tmp_path, monkeypatch): data_dir = tmp_path / "deep_research" data_dir.mkdir(parents=True) outside = tmp_path / "sensitive.json" outside.write_text('{"owner": "alice", "archived": false}', encoding="utf-8") monkeypatch.setattr("routes.research_routes.DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR", str(data_dir)) router = setup_research_routes(_research_handler()) target = _route(router, "/api/research/{session_id}/archive", "POST") with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc: asyncio.run(target(session_id="../sensitive", request=_request("alice"), archived=True)) assert exc.value.status_code == 400 data = json.loads(outside.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) assert data["archived"] is False, "file outside DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR must not be mutated" def test_detail_traversal_does_not_read_outside_file(tmp_path, monkeypatch): data_dir = tmp_path / "deep_research" data_dir.mkdir(parents=True) outside = tmp_path / "sensitive.json" outside.write_text('{"owner": "alice", "result": "secret data"}', encoding="utf-8") monkeypatch.setattr("routes.research_routes.DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR", str(data_dir)) router = setup_research_routes(_research_handler()) target = _route(router, "/api/research/detail/{session_id}", "GET") with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc: asyncio.run(target(session_id="../sensitive", request=_request("alice"))) assert exc.value.status_code == 400 # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Route-level symlink escape test # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- def test_detail_rejects_symlink_escape(tmp_path, monkeypatch): """research_detail rejects a confined-format ID whose JSON is a symlink to outside.""" data_dir = tmp_path / "deep_research" outside_dir = tmp_path / "outside" data_dir.mkdir(parents=True) outside_dir.mkdir() outside_file = outside_dir / "rp-linktest5678.json" outside_file.write_text( json.dumps({"owner": "alice", "result": "secret"}), encoding="utf-8" ) link = data_dir / "rp-linktest5678.json" try: link.symlink_to(outside_file) except (AttributeError, NotImplementedError, OSError) as e: pytest.skip(f"symlinks unavailable: {e}") monkeypatch.setattr("routes.research_routes.DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR", str(data_dir)) router = setup_research_routes(_research_handler()) target = _route(router, "/api/research/detail/{session_id}", "GET") with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc: asyncio.run(target(session_id="rp-linktest5678", request=_request("alice"))) assert exc.value.status_code == 400 # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Owner/session scoping cannot escape root # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- def test_owner_scoped_paths_stay_within_research_root(tmp_path, monkeypatch): """Owner-scoped session IDs never produce paths outside DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR.""" data_dir = tmp_path / "deep_research" data_dir.mkdir(parents=True) monkeypatch.setattr("routes.research_routes.DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR", str(data_dir)) root = data_dir.resolve() for session_id in ("rp-abc123456789", "rp-000000000001", "abc-xyz-123"): path = _confine_research_path(session_id) assert path.resolve().is_relative_to(root), ( f"{session_id!r} produced path outside research root: {path}" ) @pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_id", _TRAVERSAL_IDS) def test_result_peek_rejects_traversal(bad_id): router = setup_research_routes(_research_handler()) target = _route(router, "/api/research/result-peek/{session_id}", "POST") with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc: asyncio.run(target(session_id=bad_id, request=_request("alice"))) assert exc.value.status_code == 400 @pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_id", _TRAVERSAL_IDS) def test_spinoff_rejects_traversal(bad_id): router = setup_research_routes(_research_handler()) target = _route(router, "/api/research/spinoff/{session_id}", "POST") with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc: asyncio.run(target(session_id=bad_id, request=_request("alice"))) assert exc.value.status_code == 400