Bump the python group across 1 directory with 2 updates

Updates the requirements on [httpcore](https://github.com/encode/httpcore) and [pydantic-settings](https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-settings) to permit the latest version.

Updates `httpcore` to 1.0.9
- [Release notes](https://github.com/encode/httpcore/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/encode/httpcore/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/encode/httpcore/compare/1.0.0...1.0.9)

Updates `pydantic-settings` to 2.14.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-settings/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-settings/compare/v2.14.1...v2.14.2)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: httpcore
  dependency-version: 1.0.9
  dependency-type: direct:production
  dependency-group: python
- dependency-name: pydantic-settings
  dependency-version: 2.14.2
  dependency-type: direct:production
  dependency-group: python
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>

requirements.txt

@@ -3,8 +3,9 @@ uvicorn
 python-multipart
 python-dotenv
 httpx
+httpcore>=1.0.9,<2.0
 pydantic>=2.13.4
-pydantic-settings>=2.14.1
+pydantic-settings>=2.14.2
 SQLAlchemy
 pypdf
 beautifulsoup4

routes/chat_routes.py

@@ -1359,9 +1359,11 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
                         elif chunk.startswith("event: "):
                             yield chunk
                         elif chunk == "data: [DONE]\n\n":
-                            if full_response:
+                            _has_tool_events = bool((last_metrics or {}).get("tool_events"))
+                            if full_response or _has_tool_events:
+                                _response_to_save = full_response or "Done."
                                 _saved_id = save_assistant_response(
-                                    sess, session_manager, session, full_response, last_metrics,
+                                    sess, session_manager, session, _response_to_save, last_metrics,
                                     character_name=ctx.preset.character_name,
                                     web_sources=web_sources,
                                     rag_sources=ctx.rag_sources,
@@ -1371,7 +1373,7 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
                                 if _saved_id:
                                     yield f'data: {json.dumps({"type": "message_saved", "id": _saved_id})}\n\n'
                                 run_post_response_tasks(
-                                    sess, session_manager, session, message, full_response,
+                                    sess, session_manager, session, message, _response_to_save,
                                     last_metrics, ctx.uprefs, memory_manager, memory_vector, webhook_manager,
                                     incognito=incognito, compare_mode=compare_mode,
                                     character_name=ctx.preset.character_name,

routes/cookbook_helpers.py

@@ -558,6 +558,18 @@ def _bash_squote(v: str) -> str:
     return v.replace("'", "'\\''")
 
 
+# Shown by generated runner scripts when the ollama binary is missing on the
+# target host. Must stay free of backticks/$( ) and be emitted single-quoted:
+# an earlier version wrapped the install one-liner in backticks inside a
+# double-quoted echo, which bash executed as command substitution and ran the
+# system-wide installer (including on remote SSH hosts) instead of printing
+# the hint.
+OLLAMA_MISSING_HINT = (
+    "ERROR: Ollama not found on this server. Install it from "
+    "https://ollama.com/download or run: curl -fsSL https://ollama.com/install.sh | sh"
+)
+
+
 # Allow-list of binaries permitted as the leading token of `req.cmd` for /api/model/serve.
 # Anything else is rejected before the cmd is interpolated into a tmux/PowerShell wrapper.
 _SERVE_CMD_ALLOWLIST = {

routes/cookbook_routes.py

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 from routes.cookbook_helpers import (
     _SESSION_ID_RE, _validate_repo_id, _validate_serve_model_id, _validate_include, _validate_token,
     _validate_local_dir, _validate_gpus, _shell_path,
-    _ps_squote, _bash_squote, _validate_serve_cmd, _parse_serve_phase,
+    _ps_squote, _bash_squote, _validate_serve_cmd, _parse_serve_phase, OLLAMA_MISSING_HINT,
     _safe_env_prefix, _local_tooling_path_export, _append_serve_preflight_exit_lines,
     _append_serve_exit_code_lines, _append_llama_cpp_linux_accel_build_lines, _cached_model_scan_script,
     load_stored_hf_token,
@@ -1861,7 +1861,10 @@ def setup_cookbook_routes() -> APIRouter:
                 runner_lines.append('  exec 3<&-; exec 3>&-')
                 runner_lines.append('done')
                 runner_lines.append('if ! command -v ollama &>/dev/null; then')
-                runner_lines.append('  echo "ERROR: Ollama not found on this server. Install it from https://ollama.com/download or `curl -fsSL https://ollama.com/install.sh | sh`."')
+                # Single-quoted on purpose: backticks inside a double-quoted
+                # echo are command substitution, and this line used to run the
+                # curl|sh installer on the target host instead of printing it.
+                runner_lines.append(f"  echo '{_bash_squote(OLLAMA_MISSING_HINT)}'")
                 runner_lines.append('  echo')
                 runner_lines.append('  echo "=== Process exited with code 127 ==="')
                 runner_lines.append('  exec bash -i')

routes/email_helpers.py

@@ -1273,10 +1273,15 @@ def _imap_move(uid, dest, src="INBOX", account_id: str | None = None, owner: str
     try:
         c = _imap_connect(account_id, owner=owner)
         c.select(_q(src))
-        status, _ = c.copy(uid, _q(dest))
+        # Callers pass a real IMAP UID (from conn.uid("SEARCH", ...)). copy()
+        # and store() operate on message SEQUENCE NUMBERS, so addressing them
+        # with a UID moved/deleted the wrong message (or silently no-oped when
+        # the UID exceeded the message count). Use the UID commands, matching
+        # the move/delete path in email_routes.py.
+        status, _ = c.uid("COPY", uid, _q(dest))
         if status != "OK":
             return False
-        c.store(uid, "+FLAGS", "\\Deleted")
+        c.uid("STORE", uid, "+FLAGS", "\\Deleted")
         c.expunge()
         return True
     except Exception as e:

routes/email_routes.py

@@ -2388,6 +2388,8 @@ def setup_email_routes():
         owner: str = Depends(require_owner),
     ):
         """Read email body. Cached for 30m, sync IMAP work runs in a thread."""
+        mark_seen = True if mark_seen is True or str(mark_seen).lower() == "true" else False
+        full = True if full is True or str(full).lower() == "true" else False
         fixture_result = _fixture_email_read(uid, folder, owner)
         if fixture_result is not None:
             return fixture_result

routes/model_routes.py

@@ -218,6 +218,8 @@ def _default_endpoint_needs_assignment(
         return True
     if current_default_id not in enabled_endpoint_ids:
         return True
+    if current_default_endpoint is None:
+        return False
     if not (current_default_model or "").strip():
         return True
     visible = _endpoint_visible_model_ids(current_default_endpoint)

routes/research/research_routes.py

@@ -20,6 +20,26 @@ from src.constants import DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR
 
 _SESSION_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-zA-Z0-9-]{1,128}$")
 
+
+def _confine_research_path(session_id: str) -> Path:
+    """Return the resolved Path for session_id's JSON inside DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR.
+
+    Validates the session ID format and asserts containment after symlink
+    expansion. Raises HTTPException(400) on format failures, traversal
+    attempts, absolute-path injection, and symlink escape so every caller
+    gets a safe, confined path with no extra validation needed.
+    """
+    if not _SESSION_ID_RE.fullmatch(session_id):
+        raise HTTPException(400, "Invalid session ID")
+    root = Path(DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR).resolve()
+    candidate = (root / f"{session_id}.json").resolve()
+    try:
+        candidate.relative_to(root)
+    except ValueError:
+        raise HTTPException(400, "Invalid session ID")
+    return candidate
+
+
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
 # Model-name substrings that are NOT chat/generation models — research must
@@ -183,7 +203,10 @@ def setup_research_routes(research_handler, session_manager=None) -> APIRouter:
         if entry is not None:
             return entry.get("owner", "") == user
         # Task no longer in memory — check the persisted JSON.
-        path = Path(DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR) / f"{session_id}.json"
+        try:
+            path = _confine_research_path(session_id)
+        except HTTPException:
+            return False
         if not path.exists():
             return False
         try:
@@ -247,7 +270,7 @@ def setup_research_routes(research_handler, session_manager=None) -> APIRouter:
     def _assert_owns_research(session_id: str, user: str) -> None:
         """404-not-403 ownership gate for a research session's on-disk JSON.
         Use BEFORE returning any data or mutating the file."""
-        path = Path(DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR) / f"{session_id}.json"
+        path = _confine_research_path(session_id)
         if not path.exists():
             raise HTTPException(404, "Research not found")
         try:
@@ -361,7 +384,7 @@ def setup_research_routes(research_handler, session_manager=None) -> APIRouter:
         summary, stats — used by the Library preview panel."""
         user = _require_user(request)
         _validate_session_id(session_id)
-        path = Path(DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR) / f"{session_id}.json"
+        path = _confine_research_path(session_id)
         if not path.exists():
             raise HTTPException(404, "Research not found")
         try:
@@ -378,7 +401,7 @@ def setup_research_routes(research_handler, session_manager=None) -> APIRouter:
         """Soft-archive / restore a research report (sets `archived` in its JSON)."""
         user = _require_user(request)
         _validate_session_id(session_id)
-        path = Path(DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR) / f"{session_id}.json"
+        path = _confine_research_path(session_id)
         if not path.exists():
             raise HTTPException(404, "Research not found")
         try:
@@ -398,8 +421,7 @@ def setup_research_routes(research_handler, session_manager=None) -> APIRouter:
         """Delete a research result from disk."""
         user = _require_user(request)
         _validate_session_id(session_id)
-        data_dir = Path(DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR)
-        json_path = data_dir / f"{session_id}.json"
+        json_path = _confine_research_path(session_id)
         deleted = False
         if json_path.exists():
             # SECURITY: verify ownership before letting the caller delete it.
@@ -561,7 +583,7 @@ def setup_research_routes(research_handler, session_manager=None) -> APIRouter:
             raise HTTPException(404, "No research found for this session")
         result = research_handler.get_result(session_id)
         if result is None:
-            p = Path(DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR) / f"{session_id}.json"
+            p = _confine_research_path(session_id)
             if p.exists():
                 d = json.loads(p.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
                 return {
@@ -601,7 +623,7 @@ def setup_research_routes(research_handler, session_manager=None) -> APIRouter:
         sources = research_handler.get_sources(session_id) or []
         query = ""
 
-        path = Path(DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR) / f"{session_id}.json"
+        path = _confine_research_path(session_id)
         if path.exists():
             try:
                 disk = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))

routes/session_routes.py

@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ def _persist_session_headers(session_id: str, headers: dict | None) -> None:
         db_session = db.query(DbSession).filter(DbSession.id == session_id).first()
         if db_session:
             db_session.headers = headers or {}
-            db_session.updated_at = datetime.utcnow()
+            db_session.updated_at = utcnow_naive()
             db.commit()
     except Exception:
         db.rollback()
@@ -223,8 +223,8 @@ def setup_session_routes(session_manager: SessionManager, config: dict, webhook_
         # purge exists only to catch ghosts the frontend missed (tab close,
         # crash). Only clean up rows old enough to be definitely orphaned.
         try:
-            from datetime import datetime as _dt, timedelta as _td
-            _cutoff = _dt.utcnow() - _td(minutes=10)
+            from datetime import timedelta as _td
+            _cutoff = utcnow_naive() - _td(minutes=10)
             _purge_db = SessionLocal()
             try:
                 from core.database import ChatMessage as _DbMsg
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ def setup_session_routes(session_manager: SessionManager, config: dict, webhook_
                 db_session = db.query(DbSession).filter(DbSession.id == sid).first()
                 if db_session:
                     db_session.folder = folder if folder else None
-                    db_session.updated_at = datetime.utcnow()
+                    db_session.updated_at = utcnow_naive()
                     db.commit()
                     result["folder"] = folder if folder else None
             finally:
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ def setup_session_routes(session_manager: SessionManager, config: dict, webhook_
                     db_session.model = model
                     db_session.endpoint_url = endpoint_url
                     db_session.headers = session.headers or {}
-                    db_session.updated_at = datetime.utcnow()
+                    db_session.updated_at = utcnow_naive()
                     db.commit()
             finally:
                 db.close()
@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ def setup_session_routes(session_manager: SessionManager, config: dict, webhook_
                 db_session = db.query(DbSession).filter(DbSession.id == sid).first()
                 if db_session:
                     db_session.archived = True
-                    db_session.updated_at = datetime.utcnow()
+                    db_session.updated_at = utcnow_naive()
                     db.commit()
                     
                     # Update in memory if it exists
@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ def setup_session_routes(session_manager: SessionManager, config: dict, webhook_
             if not db_session:
                 raise HTTPException(404, f"Session {sid} not found")
             db_session.archived = False
-            db_session.updated_at = datetime.utcnow()
+            db_session.updated_at = utcnow_naive()
             db.commit()
             # Reload into session manager so it appears in the active list
             try:
@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ def setup_session_routes(session_manager: SessionManager, config: dict, webhook_
                 db_session = db.query(DbSession).filter(DbSession.id == session_id).first()
                 if db_session:
                     db_session.is_important = important
-                    db_session.updated_at = datetime.utcnow()
+                    db_session.updated_at = utcnow_naive()
                     db.commit()
 
                     # Update in memory if it exists
@@ -979,7 +979,7 @@ def setup_session_routes(session_manager: SessionManager, config: dict, webhook_
             metadata={
                 "compacted": True,
                 "summarized_count": len(older),
-                "timestamp": datetime.utcnow().isoformat(),
+                "timestamp": utcnow_naive().isoformat(),
             },
         )
         new_history = [summary_msg] + recent
@@ -1256,7 +1256,7 @@ def setup_session_routes(session_manager: SessionManager, config: dict, webhook_
                 db_session = db_session_q.first()
                 if db_session:
                     db_session.folder = folder_name
-                    db_session.updated_at = datetime.utcnow()
+                    db_session.updated_at = utcnow_naive()
                     updated += 1
             db.commit()
         except Exception as e:

routes/upload_routes.py

@@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ def setup_upload_routes(upload_handler):
         session_id: Optional[str] = Form(None),
     ):
         """Upload files with enhanced security and organization."""
+        if not isinstance(session_id, str):
+            session_id = None
         if not files:
             raise HTTPException(400, "No files uploaded")
             

services/search/content.py

@@ -8,11 +8,13 @@ import os
 import re
 import logging
 import socket
+import ssl
 from datetime import datetime, timedelta
-from typing import List
+from typing import Iterable, List, cast
 from urllib.parse import urljoin, urlparse
 
 import httpx
+import httpcore
 from bs4 import BeautifulSoup
 
 from src.constants import WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES, WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES, WEB_FETCH_USER_AGENT
@@ -91,6 +93,148 @@ def _public_http_url(url: str) -> bool:
         return False
 
 
+def _resolve_public_ips(url: str) -> list[ipaddress._BaseAddress]:
+    parsed = urlparse(url)
+    if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https") or not parsed.hostname:
+        raise httpx.RequestError(f"Blocked non-public URL: {url}")
+    host = (parsed.hostname or "").strip().lower()
+    if host in ("localhost", "metadata", "metadata.google.internal"):
+        raise httpx.RequestError(f"Blocked non-public hostname: {host}")
+    try:
+        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(host)
+        if _is_private_address(ip):
+            raise httpx.RequestError(f"Blocked non-public IP literal: {host}")
+        return [ip]
+    except httpx.RequestError:
+        raise
+    except ValueError:
+        pass
+    addrs = _resolve_hostname_ips(host)
+    if not addrs or any(_is_private_address(a) for a in addrs):
+        raise httpx.RequestError(f"Blocked non-public URL: {url}")
+    return addrs
+
+
+class _PinnedBackend(httpcore.NetworkBackend):
+    """Network backend that connects to a pre-resolved IP.
+
+    httpcore derives the TLS SNI and the ``Host`` header from the URL's
+    origin, not from the host argument passed to ``connect_tcp``. So
+    routing the TCP connect to a resolved IP while leaving the URL
+    untouched keeps SNI / vhost behaviour correct and closes the
+    DNS-rebinding TOCTOU between the SSRF check and the connect.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, ip: ipaddress._BaseAddress):
+        self._ip = str(ip)
+        self._real = httpcore.SyncBackend()
+
+    def connect_tcp(
+        self,
+        host: str,
+        port: int,
+        timeout: float | None = None,
+        local_address: str | None = None,
+        socket_options=None,
+    ):
+        return self._real.connect_tcp(
+            self._ip, port, timeout, local_address, socket_options
+        )
+
+    def connect_unix_socket(self, path, timeout=None, socket_options=None):
+        return self._real.connect_unix_socket(path, timeout, socket_options)
+
+    def sleep(self, seconds: float) -> None:
+        return self._real.sleep(seconds)
+
+
+# Map httpcore exception classes to their httpx equivalents. Built
+# once at import time from the public exception classes; avoids any
+# import of httpx's private transport machinery. httpcore's
+# ``ConnectionNotAvailable`` is a pool-internal signal (the pool will
+# close and retry on its own) — we never expect to see it surface to
+# a transport caller, so it has no httpx counterpart here.
+_HTTPCORE_TO_HTTPX_EXC = {
+    httpcore.ConnectError: httpx.ConnectError,
+    httpcore.ConnectTimeout: httpx.ConnectTimeout,
+    httpcore.LocalProtocolError: httpx.LocalProtocolError,
+    httpcore.NetworkError: httpx.NetworkError,
+    httpcore.PoolTimeout: httpx.PoolTimeout,
+    httpcore.ProtocolError: httpx.ProtocolError,
+    httpcore.ProxyError: httpx.ProxyError,
+    httpcore.ReadError: httpx.ReadError,
+    httpcore.ReadTimeout: httpx.ReadTimeout,
+    httpcore.RemoteProtocolError: httpx.RemoteProtocolError,
+    httpcore.TimeoutException: httpx.TimeoutException,
+    httpcore.UnsupportedProtocol: httpx.UnsupportedProtocol,
+    httpcore.WriteError: httpx.WriteError,
+    httpcore.WriteTimeout: httpx.WriteTimeout,
+}
+
+
+class _PinnedTransport(httpx.BaseTransport):
+    """Transport that pins every TCP connect to a pre-resolved IP.
+
+    Uses only the public ``httpcore`` and ``httpx`` APIs — no
+    subclassing of ``httpx.HTTPTransport``, no reads of private
+    ``httpcore.ConnectionPool`` attributes, no imports from
+    ``httpx private transport internals``. The URL is passed through unchanged so SNI
+    / vhost work as if httpx had been given the hostname directly;
+    only the TCP destination is pinned, closing the DNS-rebinding
+    TOCTOU between the SSRF check and the connect.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, ip: ipaddress._BaseAddress, *, http2: bool = False):
+        self._pool = httpcore.ConnectionPool(
+            ssl_context=ssl.create_default_context(),
+            http1=True,
+            http2=http2,
+            network_backend=_PinnedBackend(ip),
+        )
+
+    def __enter__(self):
+        self._pool.__enter__()
+        return self
+
+    def __exit__(self, exc_type=None, exc_value=None, traceback=None) -> None:
+        self._pool.__exit__(exc_type, exc_value, traceback)
+
+    def handle_request(self, request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
+        httpcore_req = httpcore.Request(
+            method=request.method,
+            url=httpcore.URL(
+                scheme=request.url.raw_scheme,
+                host=request.url.raw_host,
+                port=request.url.port,
+                target=request.url.raw_path,
+            ),
+            headers=request.headers.raw,
+            content=request.stream,
+            extensions=request.extensions,
+        )
+        try:
+            httpcore_resp = self._pool.handle_request(httpcore_req)
+            # Eager materialisation matches the original
+            # ``response.text`` usage in fetch_webpage_content. The
+            # sync pool's stream is a plain Iterable[bytes] despite
+            # the httpcore type hint unioning the async variant.
+            content = b"".join(cast(Iterable[bytes], httpcore_resp.stream))
+        except Exception as exc:
+            mapped = _HTTPCORE_TO_HTTPX_EXC.get(type(exc))
+            if mapped is not None:
+                raise mapped(str(exc)) from exc
+            raise
+
+        return httpx.Response(
+            status_code=httpcore_resp.status,
+            headers=httpcore_resp.headers,
+            content=content,
+            extensions=httpcore_resp.extensions,
+        )
+
+    def close(self) -> None:
+        self._pool.close()
+
 class BodyTooLargeError(Exception):
     """The server declared a body larger than the hard fetch ceiling."""
 
@@ -141,78 +285,78 @@ class _CappedFetch:
 
 def _get_public_url(url: str, headers: dict, timeout: int, max_redirects: int = 5,
                     max_bytes: int = None) -> "_CappedFetch":
-    """Capped streaming GET with SSRF-guarded manual redirects.
+    """Capped streaming GET with SSRF-guarded, DNS-pinned manual redirects.
 
-    The body is streamed and buffering stops at ``max_bytes`` (default: the
-    soft cap), so an oversized resource cannot be pulled into memory or the
-    content cache in full. When Content-Length already declares a body over
-    the hard ceiling, the fetch is refused before any body bytes are read.
+    Each hop is resolved once, validated as public, and then the actual TCP
+    connection is pinned to that resolved IP. The request URL is left unchanged
+    so Host and TLS SNI keep the original hostname.
     """
     cap = min(max_bytes or WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES, WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES)
     current = url
     for _ in range(max_redirects + 1):
-        if not _public_http_url(current):
-            raise httpx.RequestError("Blocked private/internal URL", request=httpx.Request("GET", current))
+        ips = _resolve_public_ips(current)
+
         # Force identity transfer-encoding. With gzip/deflate the wire bytes
-        # (and Content-Length) can be a small fraction of the decoded body, so
-        # a tiny compressed response could pass the hard-cap preflight and then
-        # expand past the ceiling in a single decoded chunk before the streamed
-        # cap below can slice it. Identity makes Content-Length the true body
-        # size and keeps each streamed chunk bounded by the network read.
+        # and Content-Length can be a small fraction of the decoded body, so a
+        # tiny compressed response could pass the hard-cap preflight and then
+        # expand past the ceiling in one decoded chunk before the streamed cap
+        # below can slice it.
         req_headers = dict(headers or {})
         req_headers["Accept-Encoding"] = "identity"
-        with httpx.stream("GET", current, headers=req_headers, timeout=timeout,
-                          follow_redirects=False) as response:
-            if response.status_code in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308):
-                location = response.headers.get("location")
-                if not location:
-                    return _CappedFetch(response.status_code, response.headers, b"",
-                                        False, None, response.encoding, str(response.url))
-                current = urljoin(str(response.url), location)
-                continue
 
-            # A server can ignore the identity request and still return a
-            # compressed body; httpx.iter_bytes would then decode it, and a tiny
-            # gzip can balloon into one decoded chunk far past the cap before we
-            # slice. Refuse a compressed Content-Encoding so the streamed cap
-            # stays a real memory bound (Content-Length is the compressed wire
-            # length here, so the preflight and size metadata are unreliable too).
-            enc = (response.headers.get("content-encoding") or "").strip().lower()
-            if enc and enc != "identity":
-                raise httpx.RequestError(
-                    f"Refusing compressed response (Content-Encoding: {enc}) after "
-                    "requesting identity: cannot bound decoded body size",
-                    request=httpx.Request("GET", current),
-                )
+        with httpx.Client(
+            headers=req_headers,
+            timeout=timeout,
+            follow_redirects=False,
+            transport=_PinnedTransport(ips[0]),
+        ) as client:
+            with client.stream("GET", current) as response:
+                if response.status_code in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308):
+                    location = response.headers.get("location")
+                    if not location:
+                        return _CappedFetch(response.status_code, response.headers, b"",
+                                            False, None, response.encoding, str(response.url))
+                    current = urljoin(str(response.url), location)
+                    continue
 
-            declared = None
-            raw_len = response.headers.get("content-length")
-            if raw_len and raw_len.isdigit():
-                declared = int(raw_len)
-            # Refuse before buffering anything when the server already tells
-            # us the body exceeds the absolute ceiling (Content-Length is wire
-            # bytes; the decompressed body can only be larger).
-            if declared is not None and declared > WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES:
-                raise BodyTooLargeError(current, declared)
+                # A server can ignore the identity request and still return a
+                # compressed body; httpx.iter_bytes would then decode it, and a
+                # tiny gzip can balloon into one decoded chunk far past the cap.
+                # Refuse compressed Content-Encoding so the streamed cap stays
+                # a real memory bound.
+                enc = (response.headers.get("content-encoding") or "").strip().lower()
+                if enc and enc != "identity":
+                    raise httpx.RequestError(
+                        f"Refusing compressed response (Content-Encoding: {enc}) after "
+                        "requesting identity: cannot bound decoded body size",
+                        request=httpx.Request("GET", current),
+                    )
+
+                declared = None
+                raw_len = response.headers.get("content-length")
+                if raw_len and raw_len.isdigit():
+                    declared = int(raw_len)
+
+                if declared is not None and declared > WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES:
+                    raise BodyTooLargeError(current, declared)
+
+                chunks = []
+                read = 0
+                truncated = False
+                for chunk in response.iter_bytes():
+                    read += len(chunk)
+                    if read > cap:
+                        keep = cap - (read - len(chunk))
+                        if keep > 0:
+                            chunks.append(chunk[:keep])
+                        truncated = True
+                        break
+                    chunks.append(chunk)
+
+                return _CappedFetch(response.status_code, response.headers,
+                                    b"".join(chunks), truncated, declared,
+                                    response.encoding, str(response.url))
 
-            chunks = []
-            read = 0
-            truncated = False
-            # We requested identity above, so iter_bytes yields the raw body in
-            # network-read-sized chunks (no decompression expansion); the cap
-            # therefore bounds what we actually buffer.
-            for chunk in response.iter_bytes():
-                read += len(chunk)
-                if read > cap:
-                    keep = cap - (read - len(chunk))
-                    if keep > 0:
-                        chunks.append(chunk[:keep])
-                    truncated = True
-                    break
-                chunks.append(chunk)
-            return _CappedFetch(response.status_code, response.headers,
-                                b"".join(chunks), truncated, declared,
-                                response.encoding, str(response.url))
     raise httpx.RequestError("Too many redirects", request=httpx.Request("GET", current))
 
 # PDF extraction (optional dependency)

src/agent_tools/filesystem_tools.py

@@ -281,7 +281,13 @@ class LsTool:
 
 class GlobTool:
     async def execute(self, content: str, ctx: dict) -> dict:
-        from src.tool_execution import _resolve_tool_path, _resolve_search_root, _truncate
+        from src.tool_execution import (
+            _SENSITIVE_BASENAMES,
+            _is_sensitive_path,
+            _resolve_tool_path,
+            _resolve_search_root,
+            _truncate,
+        )
         args = {}
         _s = (content or "").strip()
         if _s.startswith("{"):
@@ -322,7 +328,11 @@ class GlobTool:
                     ) == nbase
                 except ValueError:
                     inside = False
-                if inside and os.path.exists(cand):
+                # A literal that names a deny-listed sensitive file (.env,
+                # .ssh/id_rsa, …) falls through to the walk, which skips it —
+                # otherwise glob would surface secret paths that read_file /
+                # grep already refuse to touch.
+                if inside and os.path.exists(cand) and not _is_sensitive_path(cand):
                     return [cand], None
                 # Literal not at exact path — fall through to walk so
                 # e.g. "foo.py" still matches at any depth (like rglob).
@@ -334,11 +344,20 @@ class GlobTool:
                 for dp, dns, fns in os.walk(base):
                     # Prune skipped dirs before descending (unlike rglob which
                     # descends first then filters — fatal on large node_modules).
-                    dns[:] = [d for d in dns if d not in _CODENAV_SKIP_DIRS]
+                    # Sensitive dirs (.ssh, .gnupg, …) are pruned too so glob
+                    # never enumerates the keys/tokens inside them.
+                    dns[:] = [
+                        d for d in dns
+                        if d not in _CODENAV_SKIP_DIRS and d not in _SENSITIVE_BASENAMES
+                    ]
                     for name in fns + dns:
                         full = os.path.join(dp, name)
                         rel = os.path.relpath(full, base).replace(os.sep, "/")
                         if regex.fullmatch(rel) or regex.fullmatch(name):
+                            # Skip deny-listed sensitive files (.env, id_rsa,
+                            # known_hosts, …) the same way grep does.
+                            if _is_sensitive_path(os.path.realpath(full)):
+                                continue
                             try:
                                 mtime = os.stat(full).st_mtime
                             except OSError:

src/tool_execution.py

@@ -71,25 +71,35 @@ _SENSITIVE_FILE_PATTERNS: tuple[str, ...] = (
     "known_hosts",
 )
 
+# Case-folded views used for matching. On a case-insensitive filesystem
+# (Windows, default macOS) ".SSH/AUTHORIZED_KEYS" and ".env" resolve to the
+# same protected files as their lowercase forms, so the deny-list has to fold
+# case before comparing — the sibling resolver already normcases paths for the
+# same reason. casefold (not os.path.normcase) because normcase is a no-op on
+# POSIX, which is exactly where the macOS read-exfil path lives.
+_SENSITIVE_BASENAMES_CF: frozenset[str] = frozenset(b.casefold() for b in _SENSITIVE_BASENAMES)
+_SENSITIVE_FILE_PATTERNS_CF: frozenset[str] = frozenset(p.casefold() for p in _SENSITIVE_FILE_PATTERNS)
+
 
 def _is_sensitive_path(resolved: str) -> bool:
     """Return True if *resolved* falls under a sensitive directory or
     matches a sensitive filename — regardless of what root it sits under.
+
+    Matching is case-insensitive: on Windows / default macOS a case-variant
+    name (``.SSH``, ``AUTHORIZED_KEYS``, ``Id_Rsa``) points at the same file as
+    the lowercase form, so a case-sensitive check would let it slip past the
+    deny-list in every file tool that relies on it.
     """
-    parts = resolved.split(os.sep)
-    filenames: set[str] = {parts[-1]} if parts else set()
+    parts = [p.casefold() for p in resolved.split(os.sep)]
+    filename = parts[-1] if parts else ""
 
     # Check if any path component is a sensitive directory.
     for part in parts:
-        if part in _SENSITIVE_BASENAMES:
+        if part in _SENSITIVE_BASENAMES_CF:
             return True
 
     # Check filename against known sensitive files.
-    for pat in _SENSITIVE_FILE_PATTERNS:
-        if pat in filenames:
-            return True
-
-    return False
+    return filename in _SENSITIVE_FILE_PATTERNS_CF
 
 
 def _tool_path_roots() -> list[str]:

src/tools/calendar.py

@@ -254,6 +254,7 @@ async def do_manage_calendar(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
                     "calendar_href": ev.calendar_id,
                     "event_type": ev.event_type or "",
                     "importance": ev.importance or "normal",
+                    "rrule": ev.rrule or "",
                 })
             if not events:
                 response_text = f"No events between {start_dt.date().isoformat()} and {end_dt.date().isoformat()}."
@@ -268,6 +269,8 @@ async def do_manage_calendar(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
                         line += f" #{ev['event_type']}"
                     if ev.get("importance") and ev["importance"] != "normal":
                         line += f" !{ev['importance']}"
+                    if ev.get("rrule"):
+                        line += f" repeats({ev['rrule']})"
                     if ev.get("location"):
                         line += f" @ {ev['location']}"
                     if ev.get("calendar"):
@@ -480,6 +483,10 @@ async def do_manage_calendar(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
                 ev.event_type = _tag or None
             if args.get("importance") is not None:
                 ev.importance = args["importance"]
+            if args.get("rrule") is not None:
+                ev.rrule = args.get("rrule") or ""
+            elif str(args.get("repeat") or "").strip().lower() in {"none", "no", "off", "false", "single"}:
+                ev.rrule = ""
             is_caldav = ev.calendar and ev.calendar.source == "caldav"
             if is_caldav:
                 ev.caldav_sync_pending = "update"

static/app.js

@@ -4051,6 +4051,7 @@ function startOdysseusApp() {
 
   // Non-critical: load in parallel, resolve silently
   modelsModule.refreshModels(false).then(() => {
+    try { sessionModule.updateModelPicker(); } catch (_) {}
     const modelsBox = document.getElementById('models');
     const hasModels = modelsBox && modelsBox.querySelector('.models-row');
     if (!hasModels) {

static/js/modelPicker.js

@@ -754,6 +754,18 @@ export function updateModelPicker() {
   // silently pre-populate the chatbox of the next user that signed in. If
   // we have no session model and no pending-chat pick, fall through to
   // the "Select model" placeholder below.
+  //
+  // But if the server model cache already has an online endpoint, make the
+  // same safe fallback visible in the picker immediately. The send path can
+  // already resolve a usable model; the UI should not sit on "Select model"
+  // and make it look broken.
+  if (!modelId && !currentSessionId && window.modelsModule && window.modelsModule.getCachedItems) {
+    const fallback = _firstAvailableModel();
+    if (fallback) {
+      _deps.setPendingChat(fallback);
+      modelId = fallback.modelId;
+    }
+  }
 
   // Check if selected model is still available — fall back ONLY for pending chats with no user selection
   // Never override an existing session's model — the user explicitly chose it

static/js/settings.js

@@ -542,6 +542,9 @@ async function initDefaultChat() {
     renderFallbacks();
   } catch (e) { console.warn('Failed to load default chat settings', e); }
 
+  epSel.addEventListener('change', function() { refreshModels(''); saveDefault(); });
+  modelSel.addEventListener('change', saveDefault);
+
   async function saveDefault() {
     try {
       var clean = _fallbacks.filter(function(f) { return f.endpoint_id && f.model; });
@@ -558,8 +561,6 @@ async function initDefaultChat() {
     } catch (e) { msg.textContent = 'Failed to save'; msg.style.color = 'var(--red)'; }
   }
 
-  epSel.addEventListener('change', function() { refreshModels(''); saveDefault(); });
-  modelSel.addEventListener('change', saveDefault);
   if (addFbBtn) addFbBtn.addEventListener('click', function() {
     var first = enabledEndpoints()[0];
     _fallbacks.push({ endpoint_id: first ? first.id : '', model: '' });

static/js/tasks.js

@@ -1017,7 +1017,7 @@ function _showTaskDropdown(anchor, items) {
   const dd = document.createElement('div');
   dd.className = 'task-dropdown';
   dd._anchor = anchor;
-  dd.style.cssText = 'position:fixed;z-index:100000;background:var(--panel);border:1px solid var(--border);border-radius:6px;box-shadow:0 4px 12px rgba(0,0,0,0.3);padding:4px;min-width:120px;';
+  dd.style.cssText = `position:fixed;z-index:${topPortalZ()};background:var(--panel);border:1px solid var(--border);border-radius:6px;box-shadow:0 4px 12px rgba(0,0,0,0.3);padding:4px;min-width:120px;`;
   items.forEach(item => {
     const btn = document.createElement('button');
     btn.style.cssText = 'display:flex;align-items:center;gap:8px;width:100%;text-align:left;padding:6px 10px;border:none;background:none;color:var(--fg);font-size:11px;font-family:inherit;cursor:pointer;border-radius:4px;transition:background 0.1s;';

static/style.css

@@ -39695,3 +39695,13 @@ body.theme-frosted .modal {
 .log-line-default {
   color: var(--fg, #9cdef2);
 }
+
+/* The model-comparison grid hard-codes 2-4 equal columns with no phone
+   breakpoint that stacks them, so at 390px two models render ~178px columns and
+   four render ~88px columns. Each column is a full scrolling chat (code blocks,
+   tool output, vote footer), so the text is unreadably over-wrapped and clipped.
+   On phones, stack the panes into a single scrollable column instead. */
+@media (max-width: 768px) {
+  .compare-grid[data-cols] { grid-template-columns: 1fr !important; overflow-y: auto; }
+  .compare-pane { min-height: 60dvh; }
+}

tests/test_calendar_recurrence.py

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ def test_expand_non_recurring_returns_single():
 
 
 def test_expand_rrule_skips_deleted_occurrence_exdate():
-    cal = _import_calendar_helpers()
+    cal = import_calendar_routes()
     ev = _make_event(
         dtstart=datetime(2026, 7, 1, 14, 0),
         dtend=datetime(2026, 7, 1, 15, 0),

tests/test_cookbook_cpu_only_serve.py

@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ def test_local_windows_platform_comes_from_backend_host_state():
     assert "platform: _envState.hostPlatform || _envState.platform || ''" not in text
     assert 'return "windows" if IS_WINDOWS else ""' in routes
     assert 'env["hostPlatform"] = _client_host_platform()' in routes
-    assert "return _state_for_client({})" in routes
+    assert "client_state = _state_for_client({})" in routes
     assert 'env.pop("hostPlatform", None)' in routes
     assert "delete env.hostPlatform;" in running
 

tests/test_cookbook_dependency_completion_regression.py

@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ def test_windows_session_commands_use_shared_powershell_wrapper_and_local_log_di
     assert "host ? '$env:TEMP\\\\odysseus-sessions' : '$env:TEMP\\\\odysseus-tmux'" in source
     assert "function _winPowerShellCmd(task, ps)" in source
     assert "const command = `powershell -Command \"${ps}\"`;" in source
-    assert "if (!task.remoteHost) return command;" in source
-    assert "return `ssh ${_sshPrefix(_getPort(task))}${task.remoteHost} ${_shQuote(command)}`;" in source
+    assert "if (!host) return command;" in source
+    assert "return `ssh ${_sshPrefix(_getPort(task))}${host} ${_shQuote(command)}`;" in source
 
 
 def test_dep_install_success_recognized_from_exit_sentinel():

tests/test_imap_move_uid.py

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+"""_imap_move must address messages by UID, not sequence number.
+
+The auto-spam poller passes a real IMAP UID (from conn.uid("SEARCH", ...))
+to _imap_move, but the function used conn.copy()/conn.store(), which operate
+on message SEQUENCE NUMBERS. So a UID like 90521 was interpreted as sequence
+number 90521 — moving/deleting the wrong message or silently no-oping. It
+must use the UID commands.
+"""
+import sys
+import types
+
+import pytest
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def email_helpers(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
+    # Keep _init_scheduled_db (run at import) off the real data dir.
+    monkeypatch.setenv("ODYSSEUS_DATA_DIR", str(tmp_path))
+    import routes.email_helpers as eh
+    return eh
+
+
+class _FakeIMAP:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.calls = []
+
+    def select(self, mbox):
+        self.calls.append(("select", mbox)); return ("OK", [b""])
+
+    def copy(self, *a):
+        self.calls.append(("copy",) + a); return ("OK", [b""])
+
+    def store(self, *a):
+        self.calls.append(("store",) + a); return ("OK", [b""])
+
+    def uid(self, *a):
+        self.calls.append(("uid",) + a); return ("OK", [b""])
+
+    def expunge(self):
+        self.calls.append(("expunge",)); return ("OK", [b""])
+
+    def logout(self):
+        pass
+
+
+def test_move_uses_uid_commands_not_seqnum(email_helpers, monkeypatch):
+    fake = _FakeIMAP()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(email_helpers, "_imap_connect", lambda *a, **k: fake)
+    ok = email_helpers._imap_move(b"90521", "Spam", src="INBOX")
+    assert ok is True
+    verbs = [c[0] for c in fake.calls]
+    uid_ops = [c[1] for c in fake.calls if c[0] == "uid"]
+    assert "COPY" in uid_ops and "STORE" in uid_ops
+    # the sequence-number commands must NOT be used to address a UID
+    assert "copy" not in verbs
+    assert "store" not in verbs

tests/test_ollama_runner_hint.py

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+"""The generated Ollama runner must print the install hint, not execute it.
+
+The runner script emitted by /api/model/serve contained:
+
+    echo "ERROR: Ollama not found ... or `curl -fsSL .../install.sh | sh`."
+
+Backticks inside double quotes are bash command substitution, so on any host
+without ollama the script downloaded and ran the system-wide installer
+(including remote SSH serve targets) instead of printing the hint. The hint
+now lives in OLLAMA_MISSING_HINT, contains no substitution tokens, and is
+emitted single-quoted.
+"""
+import os
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+
+import pytest
+
+from routes.cookbook_helpers import OLLAMA_MISSING_HINT, _bash_squote
+
+ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+
+
+def test_hint_has_no_shell_expansion_tokens():
+    assert "`" not in OLLAMA_MISSING_HINT
+    assert "$(" not in OLLAMA_MISSING_HINT
+
+
+def test_hint_still_tells_the_user_how_to_install():
+    assert "https://ollama.com/download" in OLLAMA_MISSING_HINT
+    assert "install.sh" in OLLAMA_MISSING_HINT
+
+
+def test_no_runner_echo_line_uses_backticks_in_double_quotes():
+    # Source-level guard: generated-script echo lines must never carry
+    # backticks inside a double-quoted bash string again.
+    src = open(os.path.join(ROOT, "routes", "cookbook_routes.py"), encoding="utf-8").read()
+    offenders = [
+        line.strip()
+        for line in src.splitlines()
+        if "append(" in line and 'echo "' in line and "`" in line.split('echo "', 1)[1]
+    ]
+    assert offenders == []
+
+
+def test_single_quoted_echo_prints_hint_literally():
+    bash = shutil.which("bash")
+    if not bash:
+        pytest.skip("bash not available")
+    out = subprocess.run(
+        [bash, "-c", f"echo '{_bash_squote(OLLAMA_MISSING_HINT)}'"],
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+        timeout=30,
+    )
+    assert out.returncode == 0
+    assert out.stdout.strip() == OLLAMA_MISSING_HINT

tests/test_research_routes_path_confinement.py

@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+"""Path-confinement regression tests for research routes.
+
+Covers the CodeQL py/path-injection alert cluster (#552-#567) in
+routes/research/research_routes.py:
+  - _owns_in_memory disk fallback (alerts #552, #553)
+  - _assert_owns_research (alerts #554, #555)
+  - research_detail (alerts #556, #557)
+  - research_archive (alerts #558, #559, #560)
+  - research_delete (alerts #561, #562, #563)
+  - research_result_peek (alerts #564, #565)
+  - research_spinoff (alerts #566, #567)
+"""
+
+import asyncio
+import json
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+
+import pytest
+from fastapi import HTTPException
+
+from routes.research_routes import setup_research_routes
+from routes.research.research_routes import _confine_research_path
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _redirect_research_dir(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        "routes.research_routes.DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR",
+        str(tmp_path / "deep_research"),
+    )
+
+
+def _request(user: str):
+    return SimpleNamespace(state=SimpleNamespace(current_user=user))
+
+
+def _route(router, path: str, method: str):
+    for route in router.routes:
+        if getattr(route, "path", "") != path:
+            continue
+        if method in getattr(route, "methods", set()):
+            return route.endpoint
+    raise AssertionError(f"{method} {path} route not registered")
+
+
+def _write_research(data_dir, session_id: str, **data):
+    data_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    path = data_dir / f"{session_id}.json"
+    path.write_text(json.dumps(data), encoding="utf-8")
+    return path
+
+
+def _research_handler():
+    handler = MagicMock()
+    handler._active_tasks = {}
+    return handler
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Helper-level tests — _confine_research_path
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_confine_allows_valid_session_id(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    data_dir = tmp_path / "deep_research"
+    data_dir.mkdir()
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.research_routes.DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR", str(data_dir))
+    path = _confine_research_path("rp-abc123de4567")
+    assert path == (data_dir / "rp-abc123de4567.json").resolve()
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_id", [
+    "../escape",
+    "../../etc/passwd",
+    "/etc/passwd",
+    "safe/../../x",
+    "",
+    "rp_bad",          # underscore not in allowed charset
+    "rp-bad.json",     # dot not in allowed charset
+    "a" * 129,         # exceeds length limit
+])
+def test_confine_rejects_bad_session_ids(tmp_path, monkeypatch, bad_id):
+    data_dir = tmp_path / "deep_research"
+    data_dir.mkdir()
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.research_routes.DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR", str(data_dir))
+    with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
+        _confine_research_path(bad_id)
+    assert exc.value.status_code == 400
+
+
+def test_confine_rejects_symlink_escape(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """A symlink inside DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR that resolves outside is rejected."""
+    data_dir = tmp_path / "deep_research"
+    outside = tmp_path / "outside"
+    data_dir.mkdir()
+    outside.mkdir()
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.research_routes.DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR", str(data_dir))
+    target = outside / "rp-linktest1234.json"
+    target.write_text("{}", encoding="utf-8")
+    link = data_dir / "rp-linktest1234.json"
+    try:
+        link.symlink_to(target)
+    except (AttributeError, NotImplementedError, OSError) as e:
+        pytest.skip(f"symlinks unavailable: {e}")
+    with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
+        _confine_research_path("rp-linktest1234")
+    assert exc.value.status_code == 400
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Route-level tests — valid paths work
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_detail_returns_data_for_owner(tmp_path):
+    data_dir = tmp_path / "deep_research"
+    _write_research(data_dir, "rp-validid12345", owner="alice", query="valid query")
+    router = setup_research_routes(_research_handler())
+    target = _route(router, "/api/research/detail/{session_id}", "GET")
+    out = asyncio.run(target(session_id="rp-validid12345", request=_request("alice")))
+    assert out["query"] == "valid query"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Route-level tests — traversal and injection rejected
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+_TRAVERSAL_IDS = [
+    "../escape",
+    "../../etc/passwd",
+    "/etc/passwd",
+    "safe/../../x",
+    "rp_under",
+    "a" * 129,
+]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_id", _TRAVERSAL_IDS)
+def test_detail_rejects_traversal(bad_id):
+    router = setup_research_routes(_research_handler())
+    target = _route(router, "/api/research/detail/{session_id}", "GET")
+    with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
+        asyncio.run(target(session_id=bad_id, request=_request("alice")))
+    assert exc.value.status_code == 400
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_id", _TRAVERSAL_IDS)
+def test_archive_rejects_traversal(bad_id):
+    router = setup_research_routes(_research_handler())
+    target = _route(router, "/api/research/{session_id}/archive", "POST")
+    with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
+        asyncio.run(target(session_id=bad_id, request=_request("alice"), archived=True))
+    assert exc.value.status_code == 400
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_id", _TRAVERSAL_IDS)
+def test_delete_rejects_traversal(bad_id):
+    router = setup_research_routes(_research_handler())
+    target = _route(router, "/api/research/{session_id}", "DELETE")
+    with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
+        asyncio.run(target(session_id=bad_id, request=_request("alice")))
+    assert exc.value.status_code == 400
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Route-level tests — traversal does not touch files outside DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_delete_traversal_does_not_delete_outside_file(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    data_dir = tmp_path / "deep_research"
+    data_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
+    outside = tmp_path / "sensitive.json"
+    outside.write_text('{"secret": true}', encoding="utf-8")
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.research_routes.DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR", str(data_dir))
+
+    router = setup_research_routes(_research_handler())
+    target = _route(router, "/api/research/{session_id}", "DELETE")
+    with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
+        asyncio.run(target(session_id="../sensitive", request=_request("alice")))
+    assert exc.value.status_code == 400
+    assert outside.exists(), "file outside DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR must not be deleted"
+
+
+def test_archive_traversal_does_not_mutate_outside_file(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    data_dir = tmp_path / "deep_research"
+    data_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
+    outside = tmp_path / "sensitive.json"
+    outside.write_text('{"owner": "alice", "archived": false}', encoding="utf-8")
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.research_routes.DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR", str(data_dir))
+
+    router = setup_research_routes(_research_handler())
+    target = _route(router, "/api/research/{session_id}/archive", "POST")
+    with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
+        asyncio.run(target(session_id="../sensitive", request=_request("alice"), archived=True))
+    assert exc.value.status_code == 400
+    data = json.loads(outside.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    assert data["archived"] is False, "file outside DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR must not be mutated"
+
+
+def test_detail_traversal_does_not_read_outside_file(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    data_dir = tmp_path / "deep_research"
+    data_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
+    outside = tmp_path / "sensitive.json"
+    outside.write_text('{"owner": "alice", "result": "secret data"}', encoding="utf-8")
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.research_routes.DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR", str(data_dir))
+
+    router = setup_research_routes(_research_handler())
+    target = _route(router, "/api/research/detail/{session_id}", "GET")
+    with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
+        asyncio.run(target(session_id="../sensitive", request=_request("alice")))
+    assert exc.value.status_code == 400
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Route-level symlink escape test
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_detail_rejects_symlink_escape(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """research_detail rejects a confined-format ID whose JSON is a symlink to outside."""
+    data_dir = tmp_path / "deep_research"
+    outside_dir = tmp_path / "outside"
+    data_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
+    outside_dir.mkdir()
+    outside_file = outside_dir / "rp-linktest5678.json"
+    outside_file.write_text(
+        json.dumps({"owner": "alice", "result": "secret"}), encoding="utf-8"
+    )
+    link = data_dir / "rp-linktest5678.json"
+    try:
+        link.symlink_to(outside_file)
+    except (AttributeError, NotImplementedError, OSError) as e:
+        pytest.skip(f"symlinks unavailable: {e}")
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.research_routes.DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR", str(data_dir))
+
+    router = setup_research_routes(_research_handler())
+    target = _route(router, "/api/research/detail/{session_id}", "GET")
+    with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
+        asyncio.run(target(session_id="rp-linktest5678", request=_request("alice")))
+    assert exc.value.status_code == 400
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Owner/session scoping cannot escape root
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_owner_scoped_paths_stay_within_research_root(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """Owner-scoped session IDs never produce paths outside DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR."""
+    data_dir = tmp_path / "deep_research"
+    data_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.research_routes.DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR", str(data_dir))
+
+    root = data_dir.resolve()
+    for session_id in ("rp-abc123456789", "rp-000000000001", "abc-xyz-123"):
+        path = _confine_research_path(session_id)
+        assert path.resolve().is_relative_to(root), (
+            f"{session_id!r} produced path outside research root: {path}"
+        )
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_id", _TRAVERSAL_IDS)
+def test_result_peek_rejects_traversal(bad_id):
+    router = setup_research_routes(_research_handler())
+    target = _route(router, "/api/research/result-peek/{session_id}", "POST")
+    with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
+        asyncio.run(target(session_id=bad_id, request=_request("alice")))
+    assert exc.value.status_code == 400
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_id", _TRAVERSAL_IDS)
+def test_spinoff_rejects_traversal(bad_id):
+    router = setup_research_routes(_research_handler())
+    target = _route(router, "/api/research/spinoff/{session_id}", "POST")
+    with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
+        asyncio.run(target(session_id=bad_id, request=_request("alice")))
+    assert exc.value.status_code == 400

tests/test_security_regressions.py

@@ -894,7 +894,8 @@ def test_web_fetch_guard_fails_closed_on_empty_resolution(monkeypatch):
 
 def test_web_fetch_guard_blocks_redirect_into_private(monkeypatch):
     # A public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address must be blocked
-    # at the redirect hop, not followed.
+    # at the redirect hop, not followed. _get_public_url now uses
+    # httpx.Client(...).stream(...) so the test must mock that path.
     import httpx
     from src.search import content
 
@@ -905,14 +906,31 @@ def test_web_fetch_guard_blocks_redirect_into_private(monkeypatch):
         status_code = 302
         url = "http://public.example/start"
         headers = {"location": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"}
+        encoding = "utf-8"
 
-    from contextlib import contextmanager
+    class _FakeStream:
+        def __enter__(self):
+            return _Resp()
 
-    @contextmanager
-    def _fake_stream(method, url, **kwargs):
-        yield _Resp()
+        def __exit__(self, *args):
+            return False
 
-    monkeypatch.setattr(httpx, "stream", _fake_stream)
+    class _FakeClient:
+        def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
+            pass
+
+        def __enter__(self):
+            return self
+
+        def __exit__(self, *args):
+            return False
+
+        def stream(self, method, url):
+            assert method == "GET"
+            assert url == "http://public.example/start"
+            return _FakeStream()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(httpx, "Client", _FakeClient)
 
     with _pytest.raises(httpx.RequestError) as exc:
         content._get_public_url("http://public.example/start", headers={}, timeout=5)
@@ -1224,3 +1242,274 @@ def test_visual_report_escapes_request_category():
     # value must coerce rather than crash the render (html.escape needs a str).
     out = generate_visual_report(question="q", report_markdown="## H", category=12345)
     assert "category-12345" in out
+
+
+# ── DNS rebinding (audit finding 8.1) ────────────────────────────────
+# _resolve_public_ips resolves a URL's hostname once per hop and rejects
+# private / metadata targets, but httpx would then re-resolve the
+# hostname at connect time. The fix: the actual TCP connect is pinned
+# to the resolved IP via a custom httpcore.NetworkBackend, while the
+# URL / Host header / SNI stay on the original hostname.
+
+import ipaddress as _ipaddr
+import socket as _socket
+import threading as _threading
+
+import httpx as _httpx
+
+
+def test_dns_rebinding_blocked_by_resolve_gate(monkeypatch):
+    from src.search import content
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(content, "_resolve_hostname_ips",
+                        lambda host: [_ipaddr.ip_address("10.0.0.5")])
+
+    with _pytest.raises(_httpx.RequestError) as exc:
+        content._resolve_public_ips("https://attacker.example/")
+    assert "non-public" in str(exc.value).lower()
+
+
+def test_dns_rebinding_pinned_backend_connects_to_resolved_ip(monkeypatch):
+    """``_PinnedBackend.connect_tcp`` must ignore the URL's host and
+    dial the pinned IP at the original port. This is the core of the
+    fix: httpcore's NetworkBackend contract lets us intercept the
+    connect before DNS lookup happens.
+    """
+    from src.search import content
+
+    pinned_ip = _ipaddr.ip_address("93.184.216.34")
+    captured = {}
+
+    class _StubStream:
+        def close(self):
+            pass
+
+    class _StubBackend:
+        def connect_tcp(self, host, port, timeout=None, local_address=None, socket_options=None):
+            captured["host"] = host
+            captured["port"] = port
+            return _StubStream()
+
+        def connect_unix_socket(self, path, timeout=None, socket_options=None):
+            raise OSError("not used")
+
+        def sleep(self, seconds):
+            pass
+
+    backend = content._PinnedBackend(pinned_ip)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(backend, "_real", _StubBackend())
+
+    backend.connect_tcp("attacker.example", 443)
+
+    assert captured["host"] == "93.184.216.34", captured
+    assert captured["port"] == 443, captured
+
+
+def test_dns_rebinding_pinned_transport_dials_pinned_ip(monkeypatch):
+    """End-to-end: ``_PinnedTransport`` actually dials the pinned IP
+    when given a hostname, with the original URL's Host header
+    preserved. We stand up a local socket server on a free port and
+    make the transport connect there via the pinned backend.
+    """
+    from src.search import content
+    import httpcore
+
+    # Stand up a TCP server that accepts one connection and records
+    # the request bytes it received, then returns a minimal HTTP/1.1
+    # response.
+    captured = {"request": b""}
+    server_sock = _socket.socket(_socket.AF_INET, _socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    server_sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
+    server_sock.listen(1)
+    port = server_sock.getsockname()[1]
+
+    def serve_once():
+        conn, _ = server_sock.accept()
+        with conn:
+            conn.settimeout(2.0)
+            buf = b""
+            try:
+                while b"\r\n\r\n" not in buf:
+                    chunk = conn.recv(4096)
+                    if not chunk:
+                        break
+                    buf += chunk
+            except _socket.timeout:
+                pass
+            captured["request"] = buf
+            conn.sendall(
+                b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n"
+                b"Content-Length: 2\r\n"
+                b"Connection: close\r\n"
+                b"\r\n"
+                b"OK"
+            )
+
+    t = _threading.Thread(target=serve_once, daemon=True)
+    t.start()
+
+    # Pin the transport to 127.0.0.1:<port>. The caller hands it a URL
+    # with a fake hostname so we can verify the host header is sent
+    # while the TCP connect goes to the pinned IP.
+    pinned_ip = _ipaddr.ip_address("127.0.0.1")
+    transport = content._PinnedTransport(pinned_ip)
+
+    req = _httpx.Request(
+        "GET",
+        f"http://attacker.test:{port}/path?q=1",
+        headers={"host": "attacker.test"},
+    )
+    try:
+        with _httpx.Client(transport=transport, timeout=5) as client:
+            response = client.send(req)
+        assert response.status_code == 200, response.text
+    finally:
+        server_sock.close()
+
+    t.join(timeout=2)
+
+    request_bytes = captured["request"]
+    assert request_bytes, "server never received a request"
+    # Host header is the original hostname, not the IP. (httpx
+    # lowercases header names; compare case-insensitively.)
+    headers_blob = request_bytes.lower()
+    assert b"host: attacker.test" in headers_blob, request_bytes
+    # The path was preserved.
+    assert b"/path?q=1" in request_bytes, request_bytes
+
+
+def test_dns_rebinding_pinned_transport_preserves_url_netloc(monkeypatch):
+    """The URL the transport hands to the underlying httpcore layer
+    must still be the original ``https://example.com/...`` — never
+    rewritten to the pinned IP. SNI / vhost depend on this.
+    """
+    from src.search import content
+
+    seen_url = {}
+
+    class _RecordingPool:
+        def handle_request(self, req):
+            seen_url["host"] = req.url.host.decode() if isinstance(req.url.host, bytes) else req.url.host
+            seen_url["scheme"] = req.url.scheme.decode() if isinstance(req.url.scheme, bytes) else req.url.scheme
+            seen_url["target"] = req.url.target.decode() if isinstance(req.url.target, bytes) else req.url.target
+            raise _httpx.ConnectError("intercepted")
+
+        def close(self):
+            pass
+
+    pinned_ip = _ipaddr.ip_address("93.184.216.34")
+    transport = content._PinnedTransport(pinned_ip)
+    transport._pool = _RecordingPool()
+
+    req = _httpx.Request("GET", "https://example.com/some/path?q=1")
+    with _pytest.raises(_httpx.ConnectError):
+        transport.handle_request(req)
+
+    assert seen_url["host"] == "example.com", seen_url
+    assert seen_url["scheme"] == "https", seen_url
+    assert seen_url["target"] == "/some/path?q=1", seen_url
+
+
+def test_dns_rebinding_redirect_re_resolves_per_hop(monkeypatch):
+    """Every redirect hop must call ``_resolve_public_ips`` again.
+    A redirect to a private-IP target must be blocked even when the
+    first hop was public.
+    """
+    from src.search import content
+
+    seen = []
+
+    def fake_resolve(url):
+        seen.append(url)
+        if "private" in url:
+            raise _httpx.RequestError(f"Blocked non-public URL: {url}")
+        return [_ipaddr.ip_address("93.184.216.34")]
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(content, "_resolve_public_ips", fake_resolve)
+
+    class _Resp:
+        status_code = 302
+        headers = {"location": "http://private.example/secret"}
+        encoding = "utf-8"
+
+        def __init__(self, url):
+            self.url = url
+
+    class _FakeStream:
+        def __init__(self, response):
+            self.response = response
+
+        def __enter__(self):
+            return self.response
+
+        def __exit__(self, *args):
+            return False
+
+    class _FakeClient:
+        def __init__(self, *a, **k):
+            pass
+
+        def __enter__(self):
+            return self
+
+        def __exit__(self, *a):
+            return False
+
+        def stream(self, method, url):
+            assert method == "GET"
+            return _FakeStream(_Resp(url))
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(_httpx, "Client", _FakeClient)
+
+    with _pytest.raises(_httpx.RequestError) as exc:
+        content._get_public_url("http://public.example/start", headers={}, timeout=5)
+    assert "non-public" in str(exc.value).lower()
+    # Both hops were validated.
+    assert seen == ["http://public.example/start", "http://private.example/secret"], seen
+
+
+def test_dns_rebinding_transport_uses_public_apis(monkeypatch):
+    """Static guard: ``_PinnedTransport`` must use only the public
+    ``httpx.BaseTransport`` / ``httpcore`` APIs. No subclassing of
+    ``httpx.HTTPTransport`` (whose ``_pool`` slot we'd have to
+    overwrite), no reads of private ``httpcore.ConnectionPool``
+    attributes, and no imports from ``httpx._transports``.
+    """
+    from src.search import content
+
+    import inspect
+
+    # 1) Subclass check: must be BaseTransport, not HTTPTransport.
+    mro_names = [c.__name__ for c in content._PinnedTransport.__mro__]
+    assert "BaseTransport" in mro_names, mro_names
+    assert "HTTPTransport" not in mro_names, (
+        "_PinnedTransport subclasses httpx.HTTPTransport. Subclass "
+        "httpx.BaseTransport instead and build the pool from scratch "
+        "with the public httpcore.ConnectionPool API."
+    )
+
+    # 2) No reads of private httpcore.ConnectionPool attrs.
+    src = inspect.getsource(content._PinnedTransport)
+    forbidden = (
+        "_ssl_context",
+        "_max_connections",
+        "_max_keepalive_connections",
+        "_keepalive_expiry",
+        "_http1",
+        "_http2",
+        "_network_backend",
+    )
+    leaked = [name for name in forbidden if name in src]
+    assert not leaked, (
+        f"_PinnedTransport reads private httpcore.ConnectionPool attrs: {leaked}. "
+        "Build the pool from the public httpcore.ConnectionPool API instead."
+    )
+
+    # 3) No imports from httpx's private transport module.
+    module_src = inspect.getsource(content)
+    forbidden_imports = ("from httpx._transports", "import httpx._transports")
+    leaked_imports = [s for s in forbidden_imports if s in module_src]
+    assert not leaked_imports, (
+        f"content.py imports from httpx's private transport module: {leaked_imports}. "
+        "Use only the public httpx and httpcore APIs."
+    )

tests/test_session_routes_utcnow.py

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+"""Regression: session routes must not call datetime.utcnow() (#1116)."""
+
+import inspect
+
+import routes.session_routes as sr
+
+
+def test_session_routes_module_does_not_reference_utcnow():
+    source = inspect.getsource(sr)
+    assert "datetime.utcnow()" not in source
+    assert "_dt.utcnow()" not in source

tests/test_tool_path_confinement.py

@@ -57,6 +57,27 @@ def test_non_sensitive_path():
     assert not _is_sensitive_path("/home/user/projects/file.py")
 
 
+def test_sensitive_case_insensitive():
+    """On case-insensitive filesystems (Windows, default macOS) a case-variant
+    name resolves to the same protected file, so the deny-list must match
+    regardless of case. Built with os.path.join so the separator is right on
+    both POSIX and Windows.
+    """
+    from src.tool_execution import _is_sensitive_path
+    # sensitive directory, varied case
+    assert _is_sensitive_path(os.path.join("home", "u", ".SSH", "authorized_keys"))
+    assert _is_sensitive_path(os.path.join("home", "u", ".Gnupg", "pubring.kbx"))
+    # sensitive filename, varied case
+    assert _is_sensitive_path(os.path.join("ws", "AUTHORIZED_KEYS"))
+    assert _is_sensitive_path(os.path.join("ws", "Id_Rsa"))
+    assert _is_sensitive_path(os.path.join("ws", ".ENV"))
+    assert _is_sensitive_path(os.path.join("ws", ".Env"))
+    # both dir and file varied
+    assert _is_sensitive_path(os.path.join("home", "u", ".SSH", "AUTHORIZED_KEYS"))
+    # an ordinary file with none of the sensitive names is still allowed
+    assert not _is_sensitive_path(os.path.join("ws", "Readme.md"))
+
+
 # ── Unit tests on _resolve_tool_path ─────────────────────────────────
 
 def test_blocks_etc_shadow():

tests/test_upload_error_surfaced.py

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ SRC = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "static/js/fileHandler.js"
 
 def _upload_pending_body() -> str:
     text = SRC.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-    start = text.index("export async function uploadPending()")
+    start = text.index("export async function uploadPending(")
     rest = text[start:]
     m = re.search(r"\n(export |function )", rest[1:])
     return rest[: m.start() + 1] if m else rest

tests/test_web_fetch_size_caps.py

@@ -13,6 +13,57 @@ import pytest
 from src.constants import WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES, WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES
 from services.search import content as content_mod
 
+import pytest as _pytest_for_client_stream_compat
+
+
+@_pytest_for_client_stream_compat.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _client_stream_compat_for_pinned_fetch(monkeypatch):
+    """Adapt old size-cap tests to the current pinned Client.stream path.
+
+    These tests monkeypatch httpx.stream(...) to return fake responses. The
+    production fetcher now uses httpx.Client(...).stream(...) so it can pass a
+    pinned transport. When a test has replaced httpx.stream, route Client.stream
+    through that fake. When it has not, fall back to a real Client so unrelated
+    behavior in this file is not changed.
+    """
+    import httpx
+
+    real_client_cls = httpx.Client
+    original_stream = httpx.stream
+
+    class _ClientProxy:
+        def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
+            self._args = args
+            self._kwargs = kwargs
+            self._real_cm = None
+            self._real_client = None
+
+        def __enter__(self):
+            if httpx.stream is original_stream:
+                self._real_cm = real_client_cls(*self._args, **self._kwargs)
+                self._real_client = self._real_cm.__enter__()
+                return self._real_client
+            return self
+
+        def __exit__(self, *args):
+            if self._real_cm is not None:
+                return self._real_cm.__exit__(*args)
+            return False
+
+        def stream(self, method, url):
+            if self._real_client is not None:
+                return self._real_client.stream(method, url)
+
+            kwargs = {
+                "headers": self._kwargs.get("headers"),
+                "timeout": self._kwargs.get("timeout"),
+                "follow_redirects": self._kwargs.get("follow_redirects"),
+            }
+            return httpx.stream(method, url, **kwargs)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(httpx, "Client", _ClientProxy)
+
+
 
 class _FakeStream:
     """Stands in for the httpx.stream(...) context manager."""

tests/test_workspace_confine.py

@@ -167,6 +167,38 @@ async def test_glob_confined_e2e(ws, admin):
     assert r["exit_code"] == 0 and "No files" in r["output"]
 
 
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_glob_skips_sensitive_files_in_workspace(ws, admin):
+    """glob must not enumerate deny-listed sensitive files that live inside the
+    workspace. read_file/write_file/edit_file refuse them and grep skips them,
+    so glob surfacing their paths is an enumeration oracle for prompt-injection.
+    """
+    with open(os.path.join(ws, "keep.py"), "w") as f:
+        f.write("x")
+    with open(os.path.join(ws, ".env"), "w") as f:
+        f.write("AWS_SECRET=xxx")
+    with open(os.path.join(ws, "id_rsa"), "w") as f:  # non-dotfile key at root
+        f.write("KEY")
+    os.makedirs(os.path.join(ws, ".ssh"), exist_ok=True)
+    with open(os.path.join(ws, ".ssh", "authorized_keys"), "w") as f:
+        f.write("ssh-rsa AAAA")
+
+    # A recursive wildcard returns ordinary files but none of the sensitive
+    # ones. The pattern "**/*" contains no secret names, so a secret basename
+    # appearing in the output is a real leak (not the echoed not-found pattern).
+    _, r = await execute_tool_block(_block("glob", json.dumps({"pattern": "**/*"})), owner="a", workspace=ws)
+    assert r["exit_code"] == 0
+    assert "keep.py" in r["output"]
+    for leak in (".env", "id_rsa", "authorized_keys"):
+        assert leak not in r["output"], f"glob leaked sensitive file: {leak}"
+
+    # Directly targeting a sensitive file (literal fast-path and wildcard) must
+    # come back as the not-found message, never a match with the file's path.
+    for pat in (".env", "**/id_rsa", "**/authorized_keys"):
+        _, r = await execute_tool_block(_block("glob", json.dumps({"pattern": pat})), owner="a", workspace=ws)
+        assert r["exit_code"] == 0 and "No files" in r["output"]
+
+
 @pytest.mark.asyncio
 async def test_subprocess_cwd_is_workspace_e2e(ws, admin):
     """python tool runs with cwd = workspace (OS-agnostic probe)."""